<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Issuant Articles</title><description>Issuant&apos;s analysis of programmable, auditable assets, issuance, and capital markets - written for asset managers, banks, and issuers.</description><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/</link><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://www.issuant.com/rss.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>What the SEC Coinbase Records Settlement Signals</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/sec-coinbase-records-settlement-gensler-texts/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/sec-coinbase-records-settlement-gensler-texts/</guid><description>The SEC will pay $150,000 and reform text-message preservation to settle a Coinbase-backed FOIA suit over Gary Gensler&apos;s lost records. Here is why it matters.</description><pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 18:32:07 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has agreed to pay $150,000 and overhaul how it preserves text messages to settle a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought on Coinbase&amp;#39;s behalf over records tied to its Ethereum inquiries. The case surfaced a plain fact: the regulator lost nearly eleven months of former Chair Gary Gensler&amp;#39;s texts during its most active stretch of digital-asset enforcement. For institutions, the lesson is not political. It is that recordkeeping is where credibility is won or lost, and that the discipline demanded of the regulated should also bind the regulator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The settlement itself is small. According to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2026/07/23/sec-agrees-to-end-lawsuit-over-missing-ethereum-records-will-pay-usd150-000-in-fees?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CoinDesk&lt;/a&gt;, a joint status report filed on July 22 commits the SEC to release two previously withheld documents, disclose its policy for preserving text messages on agency-issued devices, and pay $150,000 in legal fees. History Associates Inc., the research firm that filed the suit for Coinbase, and the SEC asked the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to dismiss the matter once those terms are met. The agency also agreed to update History Associates every 30 days until its review of backed-up devices is complete.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What gives the case weight is not the dollar figure. It is what the litigation forced into the open about how a securities regulator handled its own records while insisting on rigor from everyone it oversees.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What was the lawsuit actually about?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The dispute began with a records request, not a scandal. In July and August 2023, History Associates, acting for Coinbase, filed FOIA requests seeking the SEC&amp;#39;s internal views on Ethereum and the status of ETH, along with documents from earlier enforcement actions against firms such as Enigma MPC and the EtherDelta founder Zachary Coburn. &lt;a href=&quot;https://blockworks.com/news/coinbase-lawsuit-sec-fdic-foia-dispute?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Blockworks&lt;/a&gt; reported that the SEC denied the request in October 2023, saying it could not locate responsive information. Coinbase viewed that response as evasive, and in June 2024 History Associates sued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The request had a purpose. Coinbase wanted to understand how the agency had reasoned about Ethereum&amp;#39;s shift to proof-of-stake, a question that bears directly on whether and when a digital asset is treated as a security. That reasoning matters to any issuer trying to read the regulatory line. The records were, in effect, the audit trail of the SEC&amp;#39;s own thinking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Why did the missing texts matter so much?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because of what was gone, and when. Coinbase said the SEC lost nearly eleven months of Gensler&amp;#39;s text messages, spanning October 18, 2022, through September 6, 2023. As &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/07/22/sec-settles-coinbase-foia-suit-over-gensler-erased-texts/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Crypto Times&lt;/a&gt; noted, that window overlapped with the collapse of FTX and the agency&amp;#39;s most aggressive phase of digital-asset enforcement, including its case against Coinbase itself. The records that would have shed light on the regulator&amp;#39;s internal deliberations covered exactly the period the requester most wanted to see.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The cause was not a cover-up but a chain of failures, which is arguably worse for institutional confidence. The &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-oig-review-587-2025.pdf?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;SEC Office of Inspector General&lt;/a&gt;, in Report No. 587 issued on September 3, 2025, found that the agency&amp;#39;s IT office ran a poorly understood automated policy that triggered an enterprise wipe of Gensler&amp;#39;s government-issued phone. &lt;a href=&quot;https://fedscoop.com/sec-it-gary-gensler-text-messages/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;FedScoop&lt;/a&gt; reported the sequence: the device dropped off the SEC&amp;#39;s mobile management system in July 2023, a new policy set devices to be wiped after 45 days of inactivity, and technology staff performed a factory reset on September 6, 2023, before a usable backup existed. The report titled the loss the product of avoidable errors. Poor change management, absent backups, ignored alerts, and unaddressed vendor software flaws all compounded.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The irony is sharp and worth stating plainly, because it defines the whole episode. The SEC has spent years penalizing financial firms for exactly this category of failure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How does this square with the SEC&amp;#39;s own recordkeeping crackdown?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It does not, and that is the point institutions should sit with. Beginning in 2021 and accelerating through 2023, the SEC ran a sweeping campaign against off-channel communications, penalizing banks and broker-dealers for failing to preserve business messages sent over personal devices and unmonitored apps. In &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-149?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;one August 2023 action alone&lt;/a&gt;, the agency charged eleven firms with widespread recordkeeping failures and imposed penalties that, across the broader sweep, ran into hundreds of millions of dollars. The standard the SEC applied was unforgiving: if you cannot produce the record, you failed, regardless of intent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Measured against that standard, the loss of Gensler&amp;#39;s texts is not a footnote. It is the regulator falling short of the exact obligation it enforced on others, during the period its conduct was most consequential. The settlement does not resolve that tension so much as document it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What should institutions take from this?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The substantive takeaway is about infrastructure, not personalities. Records are only as trustworthy as the systems that preserve them, and good faith is no substitute for an architecture that makes loss difficult. A single automated policy, a missing backup, an ignored alert: any one of these was enough to erase a year of communications at a federal agency with considerable resources. The failure was operational, and operational failures are the ones institutions can actually engineer against.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is where the framing turns forward. The case is a clean argument for record systems that are auditable by construction rather than by after-the-fact retrieval. When preservation is a manual policy layered onto general-purpose devices, it can be undone by a manual mistake. When the record is programmable and composable, with retention and access built into the asset and its history rather than bolted on, an authorized party can reconstruct who knew what and when without depending on whether someone remembered to run a backup. The distinction between a record you hope survives and a record that cannot quietly disappear is the distinction between the SEC&amp;#39;s predicament and a defensible system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For asset managers, banks, and issuers evaluating how to hold, issue, or raise capital against digital instruments, the standard to demand is straightforward: the audit trail should be a property of the asset, not an accident of someone&amp;#39;s IT hygiene. Regulators will keep asking the regulated to prove their records are complete. The firms that fare best will be the ones whose infrastructure makes that proof routine, which is precisely the auditable-by-design posture Issuant is built around.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SEC paid $150,000 and promised to write down how it keeps text messages. The larger cost, harder to quantify, is the reminder that even the enforcer of recordkeeping discipline can lose the record. The single thing that matters most for institutions is the one they can control: build the systems so the record does not depend on anyone remembering to save it.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Regulation</category><category>Capital Markets</category><category>Digital Assets</category><author>Carter Bray</author></item><item><title>Would the CLARITY Act bar officials from issuing tokens?</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/clarity-act-official-token-issuance-ban/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/clarity-act-official-token-issuance-ban/</guid><description>Yes. The CLARITY Act&apos;s proposed ethics rules would bar US officials, including the president, from issuing or sponsoring digital assets for pay until January 2029.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 19:57:52 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; A revised draft of the CLARITY Act would bar the president, vice president, members of Congress, federal judges, and their spouses from issuing or sponsoring digital assets for compensation while in office, with the restriction sunsetting on January 20, 2029. Enforcement would sit with the Department of Justice, which could also sue exchanges that knowingly list prohibited assets. The provision is the last major sticking point in a market-structure bill the House already passed 294 to 134.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What exactly would the ethics provision prohibit?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The proposed rules would prohibit covered federal officials from issuing or sponsoring digital assets for compensation for the duration of their service. Senate Republicans released the updated draft on July 22, 2026, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/07/22/senate-gop-unveils-updated-clarity-act-draft-with-ethics-rules-brca/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CryptoTimes reported&lt;/a&gt; that the ban reaches the president, the vice president, members of Congress, federal judges, and other covered officials, along with their spouses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The restriction is temporary by design. It carries a sunset date of January 20, 2029, the end of the current presidential term, a detail &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2026/07/22/new-clarity-act-emerges-that-s-a-start-on-the-final-draft-makes-ethics-rule-temporary?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CoinDesk noted&lt;/a&gt; when the merged text emerged. That framing matters for anyone reading the measure as durable policy: as drafted, it is a fixed-term prohibition rather than a permanent conflict-of-interest statute.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Who is covered, and what must they do with existing holdings?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Beyond the issuance ban, covered officials would face divestiture obligations. Under the draft, they would have to sell their digital-asset holdings and their stakes in digital-asset companies, place those interests in a blind trust they do not control, or do both. The distinction is meaningful for institutions that transact with politically exposed persons: the rule targets not only new issuance but existing ownership positions that create ongoing financial interest.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The spousal inclusion closes an obvious workaround. By extending the prohibition to spouses, the drafters address the concern that a barred official could route an issuance or a sponsorship through a household member. For compliance teams at banks and asset managers, that widens the set of relationships worth screening when a covered official appears in a counterparty chain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Why does this provision exist at all?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ethics language responds directly to the sitting president&amp;#39;s own digital-asset income. President Trump&amp;#39;s annual financial disclosure, released in mid-2026, listed more than a billion dollars tied to digital-asset ventures, with &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/financial-disclosure-1-billion-cryptocurrency-earnings-meme-coins-rcna352497?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;NBC News reporting&lt;/a&gt; roughly 1.4 billion dollars in earnings powered largely by meme coins and the family-affiliated venture World Liberty Financial. That figure turned an abstract conflict-of-interest debate into a concrete legislative fight.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The scale of investor exposure sharpened the argument. &lt;a href=&quot;https://fortune.com/2026/07/07/donald-trump-meme-coin-world-liberty-financial-finance-politics/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Fortune reported&lt;/a&gt; that close to a million investors in the Trump-branded coin lost a collective 3.8 billion dollars, even as the president disclosed hundreds of millions in earnings from the broader enterprise. For lawmakers weighing a market-structure bill that confers new legitimacy on programmable assets, the optics of a sitting official profiting from an asset his administration would help regulate became difficult to wave off.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How would the rules be enforced?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Enforcement would rest with the Department of Justice through a civil authority. According to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theblock.co/post/409173/trump-backed-crypto-ethics-rule-doj-enforcement-prohibits-federal-officials-issuing-cryptocurrencies?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;The Block&lt;/a&gt;, the DOJ would hold civil enforcement power over violations and could sue exchanges that knowingly list a prohibited asset. That second element is what makes the provision operationally relevant to market infrastructure rather than to officials alone.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The enforcement design is also the reason the deal has not closed. Some Senate Democrats objected that routing authority exclusively through the DOJ, and not through state attorneys general, is an unenforceable model in practice, a concern &lt;a href=&quot;https://coindoo.com/clarity-act-ethics-deal-hits-democratic-wall-over-doj-power/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;reported by CoinDoo&lt;/a&gt;. The dispute is less about whether to restrict officials and more about who gets to police the restriction, a distinction that will shape how much deterrence the final text actually carries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Where does the CLARITY Act stand, and why should institutions track it?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ethics fight sits inside a much larger bill. The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3633/titles?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;H.R. 3633&lt;/a&gt;, is a market-structure statute whose stated purpose is to build a system of regulation for the offer and sale of digital commodities split between the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. It defines a digital commodity as an asset whose value is intrinsically linked to the use of its underlying network, and it sets criteria for when an asset is decentralized enough to be treated as a commodity rather than a security.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legislative path is advanced. The House passed the bill 294 to 134 on July 17, 2025, per the &lt;a href=&quot;https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2025199?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;House Clerk&amp;#39;s roll call&lt;/a&gt;, and the Senate Banking Committee advanced its version 15 to 9 on May 14, 2026, in what &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/majority/chairman-scott-senate-banking-committee-advance-clarity-act-in-historic-bipartisan-vote?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Chairman Tim Scott&amp;#39;s committee&lt;/a&gt; called a historic bipartisan vote. The bill was later placed on the Senate calendar, but it still needs a 60-vote floor margin, reconciliation with the House-passed text, and a presidential signature.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is why the ethics clause carries weight beyond its optics. A Senate floor vote requires roughly seven Democratic votes to clear 60, and the ethics provision is the price of several of those votes. The measure that would define how programmable, composable digital instruments are classified, and which regulator supervises their issuance, is being held up over language governing who inside government may issue them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For institutions evaluating, issuing, or raising capital against digital instruments, the substance of the bill is the prize. A clean division of SEC and CFTC authority, a workable test for when an asset is a commodity, and clear rules for intermediaries would give issuers a compliance framework they can build against. The ethics debate is the near-term obstacle, but the enduring signal is that the United States is moving toward treating these assets as auditable financial products with named regulators, which is the environment in which programmable and composable issuance can operate at institutional scale. Issuers should read the delay as a scheduling risk, not a reversal of direction.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Regulation</category><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Capital Markets</category><author>Carter Bray</author></item><item><title>Is Canada&apos;s Open Banking Rollout a Revolution or a Read-Only Start?</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/canada-open-banking-rollout-consumer-driven-banking/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/canada-open-banking-rollout-consumer-driven-banking/</guid><description>Canada&apos;s consumer-driven banking launches in phases from 2026, but read-only access and no payments mean institutions should expect measured change, not disruption.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 18:42:36 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; Canada&amp;#39;s consumer-driven banking framework will begin rolling out from 2026, but the first phase grants only read access to financial data, excludes payments and account switching, and hands oversight to the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada. For institutions, this is a compliance and infrastructure milestone, not a market rupture. The disruptive features, chiefly write access and payment initiation, are deferred to a second phase targeted for mid-2027.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Canada&amp;#39;s open banking rollout is real, legislated, and finally moving, but institutions expecting an overnight reordering of retail finance should temper that expectation. Consumer-driven banking, the term Ottawa prefers to open banking, is a regulated system that lets individuals and small businesses direct a bank to share their financial data securely with an accredited third party of their choosing. What arrives first is a read-only version of that promise. The mechanics that would let a fintech move money or switch an account on a customer&amp;#39;s behalf are not in the opening act.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What did Canada actually pass, and when does it start?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The framework was built across two pieces of legislation. The government announced the initial framework in Budget 2024 and passed the first tranche of the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2024/12/2024-fall-economic-statement-canadas-complete-framework-for-consumer-driven-banking.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Consumer-Driven Banking Act&lt;/a&gt; in June 2024, covering governance, scope, and the criteria for a technical standard. The second and completing tranche, Bill C-15, &lt;a href=&quot;https://facephi.com/en/open-banking-canada-real-time-payments-2026/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;received Royal Assent on 26 March 2026&lt;/a&gt;, finishing the statutory scaffolding and adding an express prohibition on screen scraping.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That timeline matters because it has slipped repeatedly. Canada&amp;#39;s work on open banking began in earnest in 2018 and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.openbankingtracker.com/blog/open-banking-canada-what-is-coming-in-2026-and-2027?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;originally targeted January 2023&lt;/a&gt; as a launch date. That date passed, and the prorogation of Parliament in January 2025 paused progress again. The 2024 Fall Economic Statement reset the ambition to a launch in &lt;a href=&quot;https://mcmillan.ca/insights/publications/canadas-open-banking-framework-key-updates-from-budget-2025/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;early 2026&lt;/a&gt;. In June 2026 the Department of Finance &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2026/06/government-pre-publishes-regulations-to-prevent-fraud-and-facilitate-the-next-phase-of-consumer-driven-banking.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;pre-published draft Consumer-Driven Banking Regulations&lt;/a&gt; in the Canada Gazette, the operational detail on top of the statute. Eight years from committee to rollout is not the cadence of a revolution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Who oversees it, and how is the model funded?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada is the lead body. Legislative amendments expanded the FCAC&amp;#39;s mandate to include oversight, administration, and enforcement of the framework: monitoring participants, maintaining the framework&amp;#39;s integrity and security, enforcing common rules, accrediting entities, keeping a public registry, and overseeing the technical standard. The Act also created a Senior Deputy Commissioner of Consumer-Driven Banking inside the agency.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Funding is modest, which itself signals the scale of ambition. The Bank of Canada was allocated up to CAD 19.3 million over two years for implementation work, with roughly CAD 5 million per year in administrative costs thereafter. Compared with the multi-year, industry-funded build-outs seen elsewhere, this is a lean, government-anchored program rather than a sweeping infrastructure project.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What is actually in scope in the first phase?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here is the crux of the &amp;quot;don&amp;#39;t expect a revolution&amp;quot; case. Phase one, covered by Bill C-15, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9daac64b-d3fb-4d54-b73d-993d3267bf5b?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;focuses on read access&lt;/a&gt;, letting a consumer direct their data to a participating entity. The scope of shareable data, per the government&amp;#39;s own specification, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/financial-sector-policy/open-banking-implementation/2024-fall-economic-statement-canadas-complete-framework-consumer-driven-banking.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;initially covers chequing and savings account operations, investment products available through online portals, and lending products such as credit cards, lines of credit, and mortgages&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What is absent is the part that changes behaviour. There is no payment initiation, no ability to move funds, and no account switching in phase one. Those capabilities sit in a second phase &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/techlex/open-banking-2025-read-write-and-rewrite-the-rules?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;targeted for mid-2027&lt;/a&gt;, and that phase is contingent on the rollout of Canada&amp;#39;s Real-Time Rail payments infrastructure. In other words, the transactional layer that lets open banking compete with card networks and incumbent transfer systems depends on a separate piece of national plumbing that is not yet live. A read-only regime lets a budgeting app or a lender see a verified picture of a customer&amp;#39;s finances. It does not let a challenger reroute the customer&amp;#39;s money. That distinction is the difference between a useful data utility and a genuine shift in market power.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Does the screen-scraping ban change the competitive picture?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One feature does have teeth. Bill C-15 bans screen scraping, the practice where roughly nine million Canadians currently hand their banking credentials to third-party apps that log in and copy data. Replacing that with a regulated, permissioned data channel is a real security and liability improvement, and it forces every fintech that relied on scraping onto the accredited framework. That is a meaningful operational change for data aggregators and the institutions that depend on them. But it is a modernisation of an existing data flow rather than the arrival of a new one. The plumbing gets safer; the water goes to the same places.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How does Canada compare with the UK, EU, and Australia?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The international record explains the caution. The UK built what is widely regarded as the most successful open banking market, and even there adoption took years. Following &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.openbanking.org.uk/regulatory/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;PSD2 in 2018&lt;/a&gt; and a mandate on its nine largest banks, the UK reached a landmark of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.openbanking.org.uk/insights/2-billion-api-calls-and-15-million-users-a-landmark-month-for-open-banking-in-the-uk/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;more than two billion API calls and around 15 million active users&lt;/a&gt; by late 2025, but that penetration accumulated slowly and only became part of everyday financial life well after launch. The EU&amp;#39;s PSD2 delivered uneven results across member states, and the bloc is already legislating PSD3 to fix gaps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most instructive is Australia, whose &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cdr.gov.au/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Consumer Data Right&lt;/a&gt; is the model Canadian analysts most often invoke as a cautionary tale. Launched for banking in 2020, the CDR struggled with low consumer uptake and high compliance costs for accredited data recipients, prompting a government strategic review. Canadian commentators have warned directly that &lt;a href=&quot;https://policyoptions.irpp.org/2026/04/open-banking-gaps/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Canada&amp;#39;s open banking risks repeating Australia&amp;#39;s failure&lt;/a&gt; if it launches a read-only, narrowly scoped system without a clear path to payments and open finance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Jurisdiction&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Start&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Scope at launch&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Notable outcome&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;United Kingdom&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2018 (PSD2 plus CMA mandate)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read and payment initiation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;~15 million users, 2 billion-plus monthly API calls by 2025&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;European Union&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2018 (PSD2)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read and payment initiation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Uneven adoption, now moving to PSD3&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Australia&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2020 (Consumer Data Right)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read access, phased&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Low uptake, high compliance cost, strategic review&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Canada&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2026 (phase 1), 2027 (phase 2)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read access only at launch&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Payments and switching deferred to phase two&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pattern is consistent: the jurisdictions that included payment initiation from the start saw the deepest engagement, and even they needed years. Canada is beginning without that transactional layer, which is precisely why measured expectations are warranted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What should institutions do before 2027?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The near-term work is about readiness, not disruption. Banks and other data holders will need to meet the technical standard, satisfy FCAC accreditation and registry requirements, and retire screen-scraping dependencies in favour of the sanctioned channel. Lenders and asset managers should treat the read-only phase as a chance to build data-driven products on a verified, permissioned foundation, because the customers and partners who onboard in the read phase are the ones positioned to move first when write access and real-time payments arrive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For institutions that already think in terms of programmable, composable, and auditable financial data, Canada&amp;#39;s framework is a familiar shape rendered in regulation: permissioned access, a registry of accredited participants, and an enforceable rulebook. Issuant&amp;#39;s view is that the value is not in the launch date but in the discipline the framework rewards, the institutions that treat auditable data-sharing as core infrastructure will be the ones that benefit when the second phase turns a data utility into a payments capability. The revolution, if it comes, is scheduled for the sequel.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Capital Markets</category><category>Regulation</category><category>Digital Assets</category><author>Carter Bray</author></item><item><title>Visa Stablecoin Platform (VSP): What It Means for USDC</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/visa-stablecoin-platform-open-usd-usdc/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/visa-stablecoin-platform-open-usd-usdc/</guid><description>Visa&apos;s new Stablecoin Platform lets institutions mint, move, and manage stablecoins, adding Open USD support alongside USDC and USDG as Circle faces competition.</description><pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:15:50 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; On July 16, 2026, &lt;a href=&quot;https://corporate.visa.com/en/sites/visa-perspectives/newsroom/visa-stablecoin-platform.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Visa announced the Visa Stablecoin Platform&lt;/a&gt;, an enterprise service that lets financial institutions issue, store, transfer, and redeem stablecoins through one Visa-managed environment. At launch it supports Open USD, the newly introduced Open Standard consortium dollar, alongside existing support for Circle&amp;#39;s USDC and Paxos&amp;#39; USDG, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/07/16/visa-backs-open-usd-with-new-stablecoin-platform-as-circle-faces-fresh-competition?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;according to CoinDesk&lt;/a&gt;. By backing more than one issuer at the infrastructure layer, Visa turns the choice of dollar token into a decision institutions make rather than one made for them, and that reframing is the real pressure on Circle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Visa Stablecoin Platform (VSP) is a single, Visa-managed environment that lets banks, fintechs, and other institutions mint, move, and manage stablecoins with the controls, audit trails, and network reach they already expect from Visa. That definition matters because it separates two things institutions have tended to conflate: the dollar token itself, and the operational plumbing needed to use it safely at scale.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Visa&amp;#39;s own framing is that the concept was never the hard part. &amp;quot;For most institutions the hard part isn&amp;#39;t the concept, it&amp;#39;s the operational reality,&amp;quot; said Jack Forestell, Visa&amp;#39;s chief product and strategy officer, in the launch announcement. VSP provides Wallet-as-a-Service infrastructure, blockchain connectivity, and controls such as dual-approval workflows, audit logs, and transfer allow lists, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/07/16/visa-backs-open-usd-with-new-stablecoin-platform-as-circle-faces-fresh-competition?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;per CoinDesk&amp;#39;s reporting&lt;/a&gt;. It is initially available for beta testing with select clients, with broader availability shaped by what those pilots reveal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What is the Visa Stablecoin Platform, and why now?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Visa did not arrive at this from a standing start. The company reported moving &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1403161/000130817925000637/v014524-ars.pdf?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;more than $35 billion in crypto and stablecoin assets&lt;/a&gt; through crypto-linked payment credentials in its fiscal 2025 annual report, and described building a full-stack stablecoin platform with integrations into leading issuers. Its settlement business has grown quickly: an annualized run rate above $2.5 billion at the close of September 2025, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theasianbanker.com/press-releases/visa-brings-usdc-settlement-to-the-us-expanding-stablecoins-into-core-institutional-payments?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;more than $3.5 billion by late November&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20260610464331/en/Visa-Announces-New-AI-Stablecoin-and-Token-Innovations-to-Power-Intelligent-Programmable-Commerce-at-Visa-Payments-Forum?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;roughly $7 billion by March 2026&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The regulatory backdrop explains the timing. The GENIUS Act, signed into law in July 2025, established the first federal framework for payment stablecoins issued or sold in the United States, setting reserve, redemption, and issuer standards. With rules in place, the question for a treasurer or an issuer shifts from whether a dollar token is permissible to which one to hold and how to operate it. VSP is Visa positioning itself as the answer to the second half of that question.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How does supporting Open USD change the competitive picture for Circle?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here is the part that unsettled Circle. Open USD, or OUSD, is a dollar stablecoin introduced in mid-2026 by the Open Standard consortium, whose backers include Visa, Stripe, Coinbase, Mastercard, and BlackRock across a group of more than 140 firms, &lt;a href=&quot;https://fortune.com/2026/06/30/stripe-visa-stablecoin-rival-ousd-tether-circle/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;as Fortune first reported&lt;/a&gt;. Its design difference is economic: rather than the issuer keeping the yield on reserve assets, Open USD shares that float with the distributors who put the token into circulation. That directly targets the mechanism that has funded Circle&amp;#39;s growth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CoinShares called Open USD &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/07/15/open-usd-poses-biggest-threat-yet-to-circle-s-usdc-coinshares-says?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;the biggest threat yet to Circle&amp;#39;s USDC&lt;/a&gt;, precisely because it competes on the business model rather than on brand or liquidity alone. Circle&amp;#39;s shares fell sharply when the consortium was unveiled. USDC remains the larger, more established token by transaction volume, but the reserve economics are now contested ground rather than settled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Visa&amp;#39;s platform matters less as an endorsement of any single token than as a leveling of the field. By supporting Open USD, USDC, and USDG through the same controls and settlement rails, VSP makes the issuer interchangeable from the institution&amp;#39;s point of view. The following comparison sets out how the three dollar tokens differ on the terms an institution actually weighs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Stablecoin&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Issuer / sponsor&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Distinguishing model&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Notable backing&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;USDC&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Circle&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Issuer-retained reserve yield, deep exchange liquidity, longest institutional track record&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Public company, established banking relationships&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Open USD (OUSD)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Open Standard consortium&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reserve float shared with distributors, consortium governance&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Visa, Stripe, Coinbase, Mastercard, BlackRock, 140-plus firms&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;USDG&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Paxos&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Regulated issuer, network-oriented distribution&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Paxos-issued, supported in Visa settlement&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What should an institution take from this comparison?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The table shows why the decision is no longer reducible to &amp;quot;which stablecoin is safest.&amp;quot; All three sit inside a federal framework, and all three can now run through the same institutional controls on Visa&amp;#39;s platform. The differentiators are commercial: who captures the reserve yield, how governance is exercised, and how deep secondary liquidity runs. An institution optimizing treasury economics will read the distributor-share model of Open USD very differently from one that prioritizes the incumbency and liquidity of USDC. Neither reading is wrong, because the criteria are not the same.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What has genuinely changed is the locus of choice. Before VSP, adopting a stablecoin often meant adopting an issuer&amp;#39;s stack. After it, the token becomes a swappable input behind a common operational layer, which is why the CoinShares warning about Circle&amp;#39;s model, rather than its market share, is the sharper observation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What institutions should do with this&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Treat the issuer decision as a commercial and treasury question, not a technical one, and separate it cleanly from the infrastructure decision underneath. Map where reserve yield, redemption terms, and liquidity depth actually affect your economics, then insist that whatever operational layer you use, whether Visa&amp;#39;s or another, gives you the auditability, dual-approval controls, and settlement reach to move between tokens without re-plumbing. The institutions that benefit from a multi-issuer world are the ones that build for programmable, composable, auditable dollar assets from the outset rather than binding themselves to a single token. That is the posture Issuant is built to support, and it is the one this week&amp;#39;s news makes harder to postpone.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Capital Markets</category><category>Regulation</category><author>Carter Bray</author></item><item><title>Robinhood Chain: Why Memecoins Overtook Stock Tokens</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/robinhood-chain-memecoins-stock-tokens/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/robinhood-chain-memecoins-stock-tokens/</guid><description>Robinhood built Robinhood Chain to settle tokenized equities, but memecoin trading drove most of its launch-week volume. Here is what institutions should read into it.</description><pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 16:26:14 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; Robinhood built Robinhood Chain, an Arbitrum Orbit Layer 2, to settle programmable equity exposure, but memecoin speculation drove most of its launch-week activity rather than tokenized stocks. In its first seven days the network cleared more than &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theblock.co/post/408024/robinhood-chain-draws-over-3-billion-in-weekly-dex-volume-to-join-top-five-chains-bernstein?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;$3.1 billion in decentralized exchange volume&lt;/a&gt;, enough to crack the top five networks by DEX volume, yet a single cat-themed token accounted for a large share of the flow. The gap between the stated purpose (real-world assets) and the observed use (retail speculation) is the story institutions should study.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What is Robinhood Chain, and what was it built to do?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robinhood Chain is a permissionless Ethereum Layer 2, built on the Arbitrum Orbit stack, that Robinhood launched on July 1, 2026 to settle tokenized real-world assets. The company introduced it at its &amp;quot;The World is Flat&amp;quot; keynote at the Old Royal Naval College in London, following a public testnet that recorded &lt;a href=&quot;https://eco.com/support/en/articles/15859739-what-is-robinhood-chain-inside-robinhood-s-arbitrum-l2?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;4 million transactions in its first week&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robinhood&amp;#39;s own documentation is explicit about the intent. It describes the chain as &lt;a href=&quot;https://docs.robinhood.com/chain/stock-tokens/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;&amp;quot;built for tokenized real-world assets&amp;quot;&lt;/a&gt;, with its stock tokens positioned as the flagship asset class. The product page frames the network as infrastructure for exposure to names such as Nvidia, Google, and Apple, per reporting from &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pymnts.com/cryptocurrency/2026/robinhoods-memecoin-boom-shows-cryptos-retail-market-is-no-joke/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;PYMNTS&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The design goal was composable, auditable equity exposure that could trade continuously. The launch-week reality was different.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What actually drove volume on Robinhood Chain in its first week?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Memecoin trading, not tokenized equities, drove the majority of Robinhood Chain&amp;#39;s early activity. Volume climbed from just over $200,000 on July 1 to more than $500 million nine days later, according to DefiLlama data cited by &lt;a href=&quot;https://fortune.com/crypto/2026/07/13/robinhood-chain-memecoin-trading-cash-cat-vlad-tenev-crypto/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Fortune&lt;/a&gt;, and much of that flow chased speculative tokens rather than stock exposure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On a single Wednesday the network processed more than &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2026/07/09/arbitrum-jumps-19-benefitting-from-robinhood-s-usd568-million-onchain-trading-frenzy?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;$568 million in daily trading volume&lt;/a&gt;, CoinDesk reported, with the surge attributed largely to memecoin activity. Stablecoin balances on the network also climbed above $260 million within the first week, providing the liquidity that speculation consumed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A cat-themed token became the emblem of the launch. One trader reportedly turned &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/07/09/cashcat-trader-turns-usd800-into-over-usd1-million-on-robinhood-s-brand-new-blockchain?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;$800 into over $1 million&lt;/a&gt; on the token, and demand pushed its notional value toward $150 million, according to Fortune. The asset built for equities became famous for something else entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How large was the launch, and how does it rank against other networks?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robinhood Chain drew more than $3.1 billion in DEX volume in its first seven days, placing it among the top five networks by that measure, according to a Bernstein assessment reported by &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theblock.co/post/408024/robinhood-chain-draws-over-3-billion-in-weekly-dex-volume-to-join-top-five-chains-bernstein?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;The Block&lt;/a&gt;. Daily transfers on the network surged past 7 million, per &lt;a href=&quot;https://crypto.news/robinhood-chain-threaten-base-with-transactions-surge/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;crypto.news&lt;/a&gt;, rivaling established Layer 2 networks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The headline numbers are genuinely large. They are also worth reading with care. One analysis noted that the chain produced roughly $570 million in volume against about $21 million of liquidity, a ratio that signals rapid turnover of a small pool rather than deep, sticky capital.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Metric&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Robinhood Chain, first week&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Interpretation&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;DEX volume&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Over $3.1 billion&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Top-five ranking by volume&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Daily transfers&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Over 7 million&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Rivals major Layer 2 networks&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Stablecoin balances&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Above $260 million&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Liquidity that fed speculation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Primary driver&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Memecoin trading&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Not the tokenized equities it was built for&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;High velocity on thin liquidity flatters the top-line figure. For an institution assessing infrastructure, throughput and durable assets under management are different questions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Are Robinhood&amp;#39;s stock tokens the same as owning the shares?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No. Robinhood&amp;#39;s stock tokens are tokenized debt securities issued by Robinhood Assets (Jersey) Limited, not direct equity in the underlying companies. Per Robinhood&amp;#39;s &lt;a href=&quot;https://docs.robinhood.com/chain/stock-tokens/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;own documentation&lt;/a&gt;, the tokens provide economic exposure to underlying securities such as US shares and ETFs but do not grant holders any legal or beneficial rights in, or against, the issuer of those underlying securities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This structure has drawn regulatory attention before. In July 2025, after Robinhood distributed &amp;quot;OpenAI&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;SpaceX&amp;quot; tokens to EU users as a launch giveaway, OpenAI publicly disavowed the product, and the tokens later drew scrutiny in the EU, as &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnbc.com/2025/07/07/robinhood-stock-tokens-face-scrutiny-in-the-eu-after-openai-warning.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CNBC reported&lt;/a&gt;. The tokens were wrapped exposure to special-purpose vehicles, not company equity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The stock tokens are also not available in the United States and remain subject to jurisdictional limits. For issuers, the lesson is precise: the legal wrapper defines the instrument, and the settlement rail does not change what a holder actually owns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Why does the gap between purpose and use matter to institutions?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The gap matters because it separates infrastructure quality from demand quality, two things retail launch metrics tend to blur. Robinhood built a credible settlement layer for programmable, composable assets, but early demand gravitated to speculation because speculation is where the fastest money moved, not because the equity product failed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That distinction is the institutional takeaway. A network can be well engineered and still see its intended asset class overshadowed by whatever generates the most turnover in week one. Bernstein&amp;#39;s read, per &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/07/13/robinhood-chain-surges-into-top-five-by-dex-volume-bernstein?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CoinDesk&lt;/a&gt;, treated the debut as a strong start for the platform, even as the composition of activity skewed toward memes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For asset managers and issuers evaluating where to place programmable instruments, the signal is to look past launch-week volume and ask three questions. What assets settle here durably? What legal rights attach to each token? And what governs the issuer? Those answers, not a viral cat token, determine whether a rail is fit for regulated capital.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What should issuers take from the Robinhood Chain launch?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Issuers should take that distribution and demand are separate problems, and that solving one does not solve the other. Robinhood proved it could build and populate a network at scale. It has not yet proven that tokenized equities will be the network&amp;#39;s center of gravity rather than an also-ran to speculation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The more durable opportunity sits with the asset structure itself: auditable, programmable exposure with clearly defined rights and a named, regulated issuer. When those properties are engineered from the start rather than retrofitted, the composition of activity tends to follow the design rather than fight it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is the difference between a rail that trends and a rail that compounds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;FAQ&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Is Robinhood Chain a blockchain for tokenized stocks?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yes, Robinhood Chain is an Arbitrum Orbit Layer 2 built to settle tokenized real-world assets, with stock tokens as its flagship product. In practice, memecoin trading drove most of its launch-week volume, according to DefiLlama and Entropy Advisors data cited by Fortune and CoinDesk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Do Robinhood stock tokens give you ownership of the underlying shares?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No. Robinhood stock tokens are tokenized debt securities issued by Robinhood Assets (Jersey) Limited that provide economic exposure to underlying shares and ETFs, but confer no legal or beneficial ownership rights in the underlying companies, per Robinhood&amp;#39;s documentation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;How much volume did Robinhood Chain do in its first week?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robinhood Chain cleared more than $3.1 billion in DEX volume in its first seven days, ranking among the top five networks by that measure, according to Bernstein via The Block. A single peak day exceeded $568 million, CoinDesk reported.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Are Robinhood stock tokens available in the United States?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No. Robinhood&amp;#39;s stock tokens are not offered in the United States and remain subject to jurisdictional restrictions, as noted on Robinhood&amp;#39;s product page and reported by PYMNTS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Issuant works with institutions evaluating how to bring programmable, composable, and auditable assets to market with the legal structure and issuer governance defined from the outset. If you are weighing how to issue or raise capital against real-world assets on infrastructure built for regulated capital rather than launch-week velocity, our team can help you frame the questions that matter.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Real-World Assets</category><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Capital Markets</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>How Did AI Find an Ethereum Validator Bug?</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/ai-found-ethereum-validator-bug-human-triage/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/ai-found-ethereum-validator-bug-human-triage/</guid><description>AI agents flagged CVE-2026-34219, a remotely triggerable crash in Ethereum&apos;s networking layer, but human engineers had to confirm and prove the flaw before it counted.</description><pubDate>Sat, 11 Jul 2026 17:24:32 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; The Ethereum Foundation&amp;#39;s Protocol Security team disclosed on July 9, 2026 that coordinated AI agents scanning Ethereum&amp;#39;s core code surfaced a genuine flaw, CVE-2026-34219, a remotely triggerable crash in the networking layer that could knock validators offline. The AI raised the signal, but human engineers did the decisive work: confirming it was real, reproducing it, and proving it mattered. For institutions holding programmable, auditable assets, the lesson is that automated discovery is only as valuable as the human triage that validates it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What did the AI actually find in Ethereum&amp;#39;s code?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AI agents run by the &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.ethereum.org/en/2026/07/09/triage-is-the-product?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Ethereum Foundation&lt;/a&gt; identified CVE-2026-34219, a remotely triggerable crash in the gossipsub networking layer that Ethereum relies on to propagate messages between nodes. The flaw lets any unauthenticated peer crash a vulnerable node with a single crafted control message, which is why the finding matters for the validators that secure the network.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The defect sits in the PRUNE backoff expiry handler. When a peer sends a crafted PRUNE control message carrying a near-maximum backoff value, the implementation performs unchecked time arithmetic on a later heartbeat, which overflows and triggers a panic, according to the &lt;a href=&quot;https://advisories.gitlab.com/pkg/cargo/libp2p-gossipsub/CVE-2026-34219/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;GitLab advisory database entry&lt;/a&gt; for the vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The corresponding &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-gc42-3jg7-rxr2?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;GitHub Security Advisory&lt;/a&gt; confirms the flaw is reachable from any peer over normal connectivity and requires no authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer. That combination, network reachable and unauthenticated, is what elevates a coding error into an operational risk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Why could this bug take validators offline?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug could take validators offline because a single malicious message can crash the software a validator runs, and a validator that is not running does not attest or propose blocks. On a proof-of-stake network, that translates directly into missed duties and financial penalties for the operator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validators are the economic backbone of Ethereum. Institutions that stake capital, or that build products on staked positions, depend on those validators staying online to earn rewards and avoid slashing-style penalties. A remotely triggerable crash is therefore not an abstract software concern, it is a direct threat to the reliability of an asset-generating position.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The practical severity is captured in the scoring. The &lt;a href=&quot;https://cryptonews.com/news/cve-2026-34219-ethereum-gossipsub-vulnerability/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CVE record referenced by security press&lt;/a&gt; assigns a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.2, in the high range, with a network attack vector and no privileges required. For institutions, high severity plus low attacker cost is the profile that demands a patch, not a watch-and-wait.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Why did humans still have to prove the vulnerability?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Humans had to prove the vulnerability because AI agents produce a flood of candidate findings, and most of them are wrong. The Ethereum Foundation titled its own write-up &amp;quot;the triage is the product,&amp;quot; its blunt way of saying that the hard, valuable work is separating the real defects from the noise, not generating the alerts in the first place.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the recurring pattern across the field, not an Ethereum quirk. When Google&amp;#39;s AI system reported &lt;a href=&quot;https://techcrunch.com/2025/08/04/google-says-its-ai-based-bug-hunter-found-20-security-vulnerabilities/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;20 open-source vulnerabilities in August 2025&lt;/a&gt;, the company was explicit that &amp;quot;we have a human expert in the loop before reporting.&amp;quot; The AI can find and reproduce, but a person confirms before anything is treated as fact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The same discipline applied to the one live case where an AI system pre-empted an attack. Google&amp;#39;s &lt;a href=&quot;https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/cloud-ciso-perspectives-our-big-sleep-agent-makes-big-leap?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Big Sleep agent flagged CVE-2025-6965&lt;/a&gt;, a memory corruption flaw in SQLite, before threat actors could exploit it, but the &lt;a href=&quot;https://app.opencve.io/cve/CVE-2025-6965?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;official CVE credit&lt;/a&gt; names a human researcher &amp;quot;with assistance from Google Big Sleep.&amp;quot; The machine assists, the human owns the finding.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How does AI-assisted discovery compare to human review and formal verification?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AI-assisted discovery, human review, and formal verification solve different parts of the same problem, and mature security programs use all three. The table below summarizes how they differ on coverage, false-positive burden, and the role of people.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Approach&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Strength&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Main limitation&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Human role&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;AI agent discovery&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Broad, fast scanning across large codebases&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;High false-positive rate, triage heavy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Confirm and reproduce each finding&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Expert manual review&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Deep context, judgment on real-world impact&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Slow, does not scale to millions of lines&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Primary reviewer&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Formal verification&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Mathematical proof a property holds&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Costly, hard to apply to whole systems&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Specify properties, interpret results&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The economics are shifting quickly. Vulnerability reports tied to AI tooling are rising sharply, with &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hackerone.com/press-release/hackerone-report-finds-210-spike-ai-vulnerability-reports-amid-rise-ai-autonomy?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;HackerOne reporting a 210 percent spike in AI-related vulnerability reports&lt;/a&gt; in its 2025 security report. Autonomous testing has also matured, with the AI system &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2025/06/25/xbow-ai-funding/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;XBOW reaching the top of the HackerOne US leaderboard&lt;/a&gt; in mid-2025. Volume is no longer the constraint. Judgment is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What does this mean for institutions holding programmable assets?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For institutions, the takeaway is that the security of a programmable asset depends on the resilience of the software beneath it, and that resilience now rests on a hybrid of machine scanning and human proof. An automated alert is a lead, not a verdict.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Programmable and composable assets inherit the risk profile of every layer they touch, down to the networking libraries a node depends on. CVE-2026-34219 lived in a shared library, not in application logic, which is exactly why supply-chain awareness belongs in any serious due-diligence process for digital-asset infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reassuring signal for issuers and asset managers is process discipline. A finding was surfaced early, triaged by named security engineers, assigned a CVE, and pushed toward a patch through coordinated disclosure. That is the same posture institutions expect from any critical financial system, and it is now visible in the open, which is a feature of auditable infrastructure rather than a weakness.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Frequently asked questions&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Is CVE-2026-34219 an Ethereum-specific flaw?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No. The defect sits in the gossipsub networking layer of the libp2p stack, a shared component used well beyond Ethereum. Ethereum is affected because its clients rely on that layer to propagate messages between nodes, so the fix flows through the underlying library rather than through Ethereum application code alone.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Did the AI exploit the bug or just find it?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The AI agents surfaced the candidate flaw during a code-scanning exercise. Human engineers on the Ethereum Foundation&amp;#39;s Protocol Security team then confirmed it was real, reproduced the crash, and validated its impact before it was disclosed as CVE-2026-34219 and moved toward a patch.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Should institutions running validators act on this?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yes. Any institution operating or depending on Ethereum validators should confirm its node software has taken the patched version of the affected library, given the high severity score and the fact that the flaw is remotely triggerable without authentication. Patch cadence is an operational control, not an optional one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Does AI make bug bounties and human researchers obsolete?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No. The consistent evidence through 2025 and 2026 is that AI raises the volume of candidate findings while human triage remains the scarce, decisive skill. Both Google and the Ethereum Foundation keep a human expert in the loop before any finding is treated as confirmed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Institutions evaluating, issuing, or raising capital against programmable, composable, and auditable assets need infrastructure where discovery, triage, and disclosure are visible and disciplined rather than opaque. Issuant is built for that standard, giving asset managers, banks, and issuers a clearer view of the controls that sit beneath the instruments they hold, so that a finding like CVE-2026-34219 is a manageable operational event rather than a surprise.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Regulation</category><category>Capital Markets</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>Does the ROAD to Housing Act ban a US CBDC?</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/road-housing-act-cbdc-ban-institutions/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/road-housing-act-cbdc-ban-institutions/</guid><description>Yes. Section 1101 of the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act bars the Federal Reserve from issuing a central bank digital currency through December 2030, exempting private dollar assets.</description><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 18:02:10 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act became law on July 10, 2026, and its Section 1101 bars the Federal Reserve from issuing a central bank digital currency through December 31, 2030. The provision reaches only a Fed-issued retail digital dollar. It leaves private, dollar-denominated digital assets, including regulated stablecoins, untouched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What does the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act do to a US central bank digital currency?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) through the end of 2030. The restriction sits in Title XI, Section 1101 of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/6644/text?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;H.R. 6644&lt;/a&gt;, an affordable-housing package that carried the currency provision as an unrelated rider.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;According to the &lt;a href=&quot;https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2026-06-22-_fsc_sxs_-_21st_century_road_housing.pdf?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;House Financial Services Committee section-by-section summary&lt;/a&gt; dated June 22, 2026, Section 1101 blocks the Fed from issuing a CBDC through December 31, 2030. The statutory text states that the Board of Governors or a Federal reserve bank &amp;quot;may not issue or create a central bank digital currency or any digital asset that is substantially similar to a central bank digital currency directly or indirectly through a financial institution or other intermediary,&amp;quot; as &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2026/06/22/u-s-senate-passes-housing-bill-that-carries-four-year-ban-on-a-fed-cbdc?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CoinDesk reported&lt;/a&gt; on the Senate passage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;When did the CBDC restriction take effect?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The restriction took effect on July 10, 2026, when the housing bill became law. As &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2026/07/10/u-s-government-digital-dollar-set-to-be-banned-tonight-under-housing-law-s-cbdc-limit?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CoinDesk noted&lt;/a&gt;, the affordability bill lapsed into law that Friday along with the four-year currency provision, after the President declined to sign it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The measure became law without a signature. Reporting from &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2026/07/10/nx-s1-5885027/housing-bill-without-trump-signature?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;NPR&lt;/a&gt; explained that the bill cleared both chambers and, once the ten-day presidential window passed without a veto, took effect automatically. For institutions, the operative point is that the ban is now statute rather than executive discretion, and its 2030 sunset is fixed in law.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How is a central bank digital currency defined in the statute?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The statute defines a CBDC narrowly: a dollar-denominated digital asset that is United States currency, a direct liability of the Federal Reserve, and made widely available to the general public. That definition, described by &lt;a href=&quot;https://coinpaprika.com/news/congress-slips-fed-digital-dollar-ban-housing/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CoinPaprika&lt;/a&gt;, targets a retail liability of the central bank rather than the broader universe of digital-dollar instruments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The definition matters because it draws a clean line. A direct central-bank liability held by the public falls inside the prohibition. A private issuer&amp;#39;s dollar claim, backed by reserves and settled through commercial infrastructure, falls outside it. The law restricts who issues the instrument, not whether dollars can move in programmable form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Are private dollar-denominated digital assets and stablecoins exempt?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yes. The law expressly protects private dollar instruments. Its text says the provision &amp;quot;shall not prohibit any dollar-denominated currency that is open, permissionless and private, and fully preserves the privacy protections of United States coins and physical currency,&amp;quot; per &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pymnts.com/cbdc/2026/lawmakers-fast-track-bipartisan-housing-bill-with-cbdc-ban/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;PYMNTS&lt;/a&gt;, which drew the language from the Congress.gov text.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That carve-out covers privately issued, dollar-referenced digital assets. &lt;a href=&quot;https://coinpaprika.com/news/congress-slips-fed-digital-dollar-ban-housing/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CoinPaprika&lt;/a&gt; reported that the exemption keeps the restriction focused on a Fed-issued retail product while leaving room for private issuance. For issuers and asset managers, the policy signal is direct: the United States is closing the door on a public retail digital dollar while keeping it open for regulated private alternatives.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How does this fit with earlier US CBDC policy?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The housing law codifies a stance that began as executive policy in early 2025. The &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/strengthening-american-leadership-in-digital-financial-technology/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;White House executive order&lt;/a&gt; of January 23, 2025, prohibited agencies from establishing, issuing, or promoting a CBDC. The order set direction, but an executive order can be reversed by a later administration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Congress then moved to make the position durable. The House passed the standalone &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1919?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Anti-CBDC Surveillance State Act (H.R. 1919)&lt;/a&gt;, sponsored by Representative Tom Emmer, by a vote of 219 to 210 on July 17, 2025, according to the &lt;a href=&quot;https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2025201?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Office of the Clerk&lt;/a&gt;. When that bill stalled in the Senate, the substance moved onto the housing package. The result: a temporary but statutory ban, with a defined 2030 horizon, rather than a policy that turns over with each administration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What the CBDC ban covers and what it leaves open&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Feature&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Fed-issued retail CBDC&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Private dollar-denominated digital asset&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Issuer&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Federal Reserve&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Regulated private institution&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Legal status through 2030&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Prohibited under Section 1101&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Permitted, expressly carved out&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Balance-sheet nature&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Direct liability of the central bank&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Liability of the private issuer, reserve-backed&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Public availability&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Barred as a retail product&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Available subject to applicable regulation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Basis in law&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Statute, sunsets December 31, 2030&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Governed by existing financial rules&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Why this matters for issuers and asset managers&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The practical effect is that programmable dollar rails in the United States will run through private issuers, not the central bank, at least through 2030. Institutions weighing dollar-settlement infrastructure now have a clearer policy backdrop: the sovereign will not compete as a retail issuer, and privately issued dollar claims remain the compliant path to programmable settlement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That clarity shifts the questions institutions should ask. The relevant considerations are reserve quality, redemption rights, auditability of backing, and the regulatory regime that governs a given issuer, rather than whether a public digital dollar might crowd out private products. A fixed 2030 sunset also means the landscape can change, so any long-horizon commitment should account for a possible policy reset when the ban lapses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Institutions evaluating how to issue, hold, or raise capital against programmable, composable, and auditable dollar assets can explore how Issuant approaches these questions, with an emphasis on reserve transparency and compliant issuance frameworks that align with the direction this law now sets.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Regulation</category><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Capital Markets</category><author>Carter Bray</author></item><item><title>What is Swift&apos;s blockchain shared ledger?</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/swift-blockchain-shared-ledger-settlement/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/swift-blockchain-shared-ledger-settlement/</guid><description>Swift&apos;s blockchain-based shared ledger lets 17 banks pilot 24/7 programmable cross-border transfers, though final settlement still clears on traditional rails.</description><pubDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 17:56:18 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; Swift&amp;#39;s blockchain-based shared ledger is a bank-owned record of interbank transactions that lets institutions move regulated digital value around the clock, and as of July 2026 seventeen banks across six continents are piloting live transfers on it. The ledger records, sequences, and validates transfers and enforces rules through smart contracts, but final settlement of value still depends on existing account and clearing systems rather than the ledger itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What is Swift&amp;#39;s blockchain-based shared ledger?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Swift&amp;#39;s blockchain-based shared ledger is a shared, real-time record of transactions between financial institutions, designed to let banks exchange regulated digital value continuously rather than only during business hours. Swift &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swift-add-blockchain-based-ledger-its-infrastructure-stack-groundbreaking-move-accelerate-and-scale-benefits-digital-finance?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;announced the project on 29 September 2025&lt;/a&gt; at the Sibos conference in Frankfurt, framing it as an addition to its existing messaging network across more than 200 countries and territories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ledger records, sequences, and validates transactions and enforces business rules through smart contracts. Swift is building it with software firm &lt;a href=&quot;https://consensys.io/blog/consensys-scaling-decentralized-finance?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Consensys&lt;/a&gt;, and more than 30 institutions signed on at launch. The design group later grew to over 40 banks, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ledgerinsights.com/swift-to-run-live-tokenized-deposit-payments-on-blockchain-mvp-in-2026/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;according to Ledger Insights&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The intent is composability. The ledger is built to carry any form of regulated digital value, so a payment can move against a deposit or an asset under a single programmable instruction rather than across separate, disconnected systems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Why does 24/7 operation matter for institutions?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Continuous operation matters because the existing correspondent banking model closes on weekends and holidays and settles in local business windows, which strands liquidity and delays cross-border transfers. An always-on ledger removes that calendar constraint, letting an institution send and receive value at any hour.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That shift has practical treasury consequences. Funds held to cover time-zone gaps and weekend cutoffs can be released for other use. Settlement that once waited for the next business day can complete in near real time, tightening working-capital cycles for the institutions on the network.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Swift is not proposing to replace its messaging business. The ledger sits alongside the network that already connects most of the world&amp;#39;s banks, which is what lets Swift reach a large group of established institutions from day one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Which banks are piloting the Swift ledger?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Seventeen banks across six continents are piloting live transfers, Swift &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.swift.com/news-events/press-releases/swifts-blockchain-ledger-ready-use-17-banks-set-pioneer-tokenised-cross-border-payments-trusted-global-infrastructure?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;confirmed on 9 July 2026&lt;/a&gt;. The pilot group is: ANZ, BNP Paribas, BNY, Citi, DBS, First Abu Dhabi Bank, FirstRand Bank, HSBC, Itaú Unibanco, Lloyds Bank, Mashreq, MUFG Bank, OCBC, Standard Chartered, UBS, UOB, and Wells Fargo, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.business-standard.com/industry/banking/hsbc-citi-dbs-among-17-banks-to-pilot-swift-s-blockchain-ledger-126070901408_1.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;per Business Standard&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The earlier design phase drew a broader roster of large lenders. JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, and Bank of America were among the institutions that shaped the ledger&amp;#39;s design, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-29/swift-to-build-a-blockchain-based-ledger-for-financial-firms?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Bloomberg reported&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first live use case is regulated deposit transfers between the piloting banks, a deliberately narrow scope for institutions that need auditability and legal certainty before widening the range of instruments carried on the ledger.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What technology underpins the ledger?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ledger is built on Ethereum infrastructure, specifically the Consensys-developed layer-2 network Linea. Consensys chief executive Joseph Lubin confirmed the choice at the TOKEN2049 conference in Singapore, &lt;a href=&quot;https://coinmarketcap.com/academy/article/swift-confirms-linea-blockchain-for-payment-settlement-platform?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;as reported by CoinMarketCap&lt;/a&gt;, after Swift&amp;#39;s original announcement named a design partner but not the underlying platform.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Swift chose Linea in part for its transaction-confidentiality features, which use cryptographic proofs to keep transfer details private between counterparties, &lt;a href=&quot;https://cryptoslate.com/swift-reportedly-picks-linea-for-multi-month-interbank-messaging-system-transition/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;according to CryptoSlate&lt;/a&gt;. Confidentiality is a precondition for interbank use, since institutions cannot expose client positions or flows to competitors on a shared record.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The project moved from design to a minimum viable product build in early 2026, with the go-live pilot following in July. The choice of a widely used, auditable base layer is meant to give supervisors and risk teams a familiar foundation to assess.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Does the ledger actually settle payments, or does it still rely on old rails?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ledger does not yet settle value on its own; final settlement still clears through existing account and correspondent systems. The ledger provides the shared record, the sequencing, and the programmable logic, but the underlying transfer of funds continues to depend on the traditional infrastructure banks already use.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the gap between messaging and settlement. Swift&amp;#39;s network has always coordinated payment instructions while the actual movement of money happened in separate clearing and real-time gross settlement systems. The shared ledger modernises the coordination layer and adds programmability, yet the leg where value changes hands has not been rebuilt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That distinction matters for anyone evaluating the ledger as settlement infrastructure. Continuous, programmable instruction is a real advance, but true atomic settlement, where the payment and the asset move together and irreversibly in one step, is not what the current pilot delivers. Until regulated digital cash settles natively on the ledger, the round-the-clock promise runs ahead of the plumbing beneath it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How does this compare to competing approaches?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Swift&amp;#39;s approach differs from purpose-built settlement networks by prioritising reach and neutrality over native settlement. The table below sets out the practical trade-offs institutions weigh.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Dimension&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Swift shared ledger&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Dedicated settlement networks&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reach&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Sits on Swift&amp;#39;s network across 200+ countries&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Typically limited to onboarded members&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Instrument scope&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Built to carry any regulated digital value&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Often tied to a specific asset or token&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Settlement&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Coordination and record; value clears on existing rails&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Some offer native, on-ledger settlement&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Governance&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Bank-owned, cooperative model&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Varies from single-operator to consortium&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The advantage of Swift&amp;#39;s model is that it starts with the institutions already connected to its network, avoiding the cold-start problem that limits standalone platforms. The cost is that settlement remains split from the record for now.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Frequently asked questions&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Is the Swift ledger live for real transactions?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pilot is live as of July 2026, with 17 banks preparing to run live regulated deposit transfers. It is an early-adopter pilot rather than a full production rollout, and the initial scope is deliberately narrow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Does the shared ledger replace Swift messaging?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No. Swift has positioned the ledger as an addition to its existing messaging network, not a replacement. The two are designed to run together, which is how Swift reaches its large base of member institutions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;What blockchain is the ledger built on?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is built on Linea, an Ethereum layer-2 network developed by Consensys. Swift cited the network&amp;#39;s confidentiality features, which use cryptographic proofs, as a reason for the choice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Can the ledger settle payments without traditional systems?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Not currently. The ledger records and coordinates transfers and runs smart-contract logic, but final settlement of value still clears through existing account and correspondent systems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For institutions weighing how programmable, composable, and auditable value will move as this infrastructure matures, the distinction between coordinating a transfer and settling it is the one that shapes real-world design. Issuant works with issuers, banks, and asset managers evaluating how to structure and settle regulated digital assets, and follows developments like Swift&amp;#39;s shared ledger to help institutions plan for the moment when record and settlement finally converge.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Capital Markets</category><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Payments</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>Dinari and tZERO Build Turnkey Tokenized Equities Platform</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/dinari-tzero-tokenized-equities-platform/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/dinari-tzero-tokenized-equities-platform/</guid><description>Dinari and tZERO have partnered to give U.S. broker-dealers a single-network route to launch, trade, custody, clear, settle, and service tokenized U.S. equities.</description><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 16:28:51 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; Dinari and tZERO have partnered to give U.S. broker-dealers a single-network route to launch, trade, custody, clear, settle, and service tokenized U.S. equities. Announced on July 8, 2026, the arrangement pairs Dinari&amp;#39;s 1:1 backed equity tokens (dShares) with tZERO&amp;#39;s regulated trading, custody, and settlement infrastructure. It is aimed at broker-dealers that want to offer programmable equity exposure without assembling the licensing and market plumbing themselves.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What did Dinari and tZERO announce?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dinari and tZERO agreed to create an operating framework that lets broker-dealers offer tokenized U.S. equities through one network integration. The &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2026-07/68975690-eqs-news-tzero-dinari-inc-and-tzero-partner-to-create-an-operating-framework-for-broker-dealers-to-offer-tokenized-u-s-equities-023.htm?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;official announcement&lt;/a&gt;, issued July 8, 2026, describes a platform that supplies the market capabilities a broker-dealer needs to launch, trade, custody, clear, settle, and service these instruments.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The intent is practical. Rather than requiring each firm to secure its own licenses and build its own market infrastructure, the partnership packages those functions into a shared operating layer. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/business/2026/07/08/dinari-tzero-join-forces-on-turnkey-platform-for-tokenized-u-s-equities?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CoinDesk&lt;/a&gt; reported the deal the same day, framing it as a turnkey route for broker-dealers into tokenized stocks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What is a tokenized U.S. equity in this context?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A tokenized U.S. equity here is a digital representation of a listed share, backed one to one by the underlying security held in custody by a registered broker-dealer. It is a programmable claim on a real share, not a synthetic or derivative substitute.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dinari markets these instruments as &lt;a href=&quot;https://dinari.com/dshares?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;dShares&lt;/a&gt;, tokenized representations of traditional equities backed 1:1 by the underlying securities. Compliance is enforced at the instrument level: each dShare carries embedded transfer logic, so non-compliant transfers fail by design, and wallets must clear identity checks before interacting with them. Dinari says its dShares retain shareholder economics, including dividends and corporate actions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What does each company bring to the platform?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dinari supplies the issuance and backing model; tZERO supplies the regulated trading, custody, and settlement rails. The division of labor is the point of the deal.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dinari Securities, LLC is an SEC-registered, FINRA-member broker-dealer that acquires the underlying share and mints a matching token to a verified investor, so every token in circulation has a corresponding share locked in custody. The company raised a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2025/05/01/dinari-raises-usd12-7m-to-expand-tokenized-stock-access-for-non-u-s-investors?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;$12.7 million Series A&lt;/a&gt; led by Hack VC and Blockchange Ventures in May 2025, and its catalog has since grown past 350 tokenized instruments including U.S. stocks, ETFs, and REITs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tZERO contributes the market side. tZERO Securities, LLC is an SEC-registered broker-dealer and FINRA and SIPC member that operates the tZERO ATS, and tZERO Transfer Services is an SEC-registered transfer agent. In September 2024, tZERO &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tzero-receives-landmark-approval-to-custody-digital-securities-and-support-end-to-end-digital-securities-lifecycle-in-the-united-states-302242412.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;received approval&lt;/a&gt; for a special purpose broker-dealer that can custody, clear, and settle digital asset securities under U.S. rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How does the single-network model work for a broker-dealer?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The single-network model lets a broker-dealer plug into one integration and inherit the licensing, custody, and settlement functions rather than building each piece in-house. That is the core efficiency the two firms are selling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In practice, a participating firm can offer clients tokenized equity exposure while Dinari handles the backing and token issuance and tZERO handles the regulated trading, custody, clearing, and settlement lifecycle. The design compresses a multi-vendor, multi-license buildout into a single connection.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;How does this compare with building the capability alone?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Building the same capability alone means separately securing broker-dealer registration, a trading venue, custody approval, and transfer-agent functions, then integrating them. The partnership consolidates those into one operating framework.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Function&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Assemble in-house&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Dinari and tZERO framework&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Equity backing and issuance&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Build custody and minting model&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Provided by Dinari (1:1 backed dShares)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Trading venue&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Register or connect to an ATS&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;tZERO ATS&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Custody, clearing, settlement&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Secure special purpose broker-dealer status&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;tZERO special purpose broker-dealer&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Transfer agent&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Register separately with the SEC&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;tZERO Transfer Services&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Integration effort&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Multiple vendors and licenses&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Single network integration&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Where does U.S. regulation stand on tokenized securities?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;U.S. regulators have been consistent that tokenizing a security does not change its legal status. SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce put it plainly in a July 2025 &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/peirce-statement-tokenized-securities-070925?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;statement&lt;/a&gt;: tokenized securities are still securities, and issuers and intermediaries must comply with the federal securities laws.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SEC staff developed the theme further in a January 2026 &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/corp-fin-statement-tokenized-securities-012826-statement-tokenized-securities?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;statement on tokenized securities&lt;/a&gt;, which maps different tokenization models and stresses that the specific structure matters for how existing rules apply. That regulatory posture rewards the custodial, licensed approach both Dinari and tZERO have built, where a real share sits behind each token and regulated intermediaries handle the lifecycle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;FAQ&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Is a tokenized U.S. equity a security under SEC rules?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yes. SEC guidance treats a tokenized security as a security, meaning the same registration, disclosure, and intermediary obligations apply as they would to the underlying share. Tokenization changes the form, not the legal character.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;What is tZERO&amp;#39;s special purpose broker-dealer approval?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is an SEC and FINRA authorization that allows tZERO to custody, clear, and settle digital asset securities under U.S. rules. tZERO has described itself as one of only two entities holding such approval nationwide, which is what lets it anchor the settlement side of this platform.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;How are Dinari&amp;#39;s dShares backed?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Each dShare is backed one to one by the underlying U.S. security, which a registered broker-dealer holds in custody. A representative token is minted to a verified investor&amp;#39;s wallet, and compliance logic is embedded at the token level so restricted transfers fail automatically.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Who is the platform built for?&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is built for broker-dealers and institutions that want to offer tokenized U.S. equity exposure without independently assembling broker-dealer registration, a trading venue, custody, settlement, and transfer-agent functions. The single-network model supplies those capabilities through one integration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Institutions weighing whether to issue, trade, or raise against programmable equity exposure face the same question this partnership answers: how to combine real backing, embedded compliance, and regulated settlement without rebuilding market infrastructure from scratch. Issuant works with issuers and capital-markets participants evaluating programmable, composable, and auditable asset structures, and can help frame where a custodial, standards-aligned approach fits a given mandate.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Capital Markets</category><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Issuance</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>Programmable Assets Have Reached $43 Billion in Value</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/programmable-assets-43-billion-institutional-adoption/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/programmable-assets-43-billion-institutional-adoption/</guid><description>The programmable asset market has crossed $43 billion, driven by institutional adoption in private credit, government securities, and fund structures with regulatory clarity.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 22:37:41 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; The programmable asset market has crossed $43 billion in total value, driven by issuance in private credit, government securities, and fund structures. Major asset managers, banks, and sovereign-linked issuers are moving beyond pilot programs into production-scale deployment. Regulatory clarity from the SEC and the GENIUS Act has given institutions the framework they need to proceed with confidence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;$43 Billion and Still Concentrated: What the Market Actually Holds&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The headline figure reflects a market that has grown with unusual speed but remains structurally narrow. Private credit alone accounted for over 58% of programmable asset flows in the first half of 2025, while government securities accounted for 34%, pointing to strong institutional issuance in the most credit-familiar parts of the capital structure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Programmable funds - backed by US Treasury bills, bonds, and money market instruments - represent the largest single segment, comprising roughly 44.5% of the total market at approximately $10.5 billion in value, followed by commodities and equities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That concentration is a feature, not a flaw. Issuers and managers are proving out the infrastructure on instruments they already understand - short-duration, high-quality, liquid - before extending it to more complex asset classes. The pattern mirrors how electronic trading expanded in fixed income: methodology before breadth.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Institutional Roster Has Changed&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is no longer a market defined by specialist platforms. The names issuing and operating programmable instruments now include the largest asset managers in the world.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BlackRock has established early leadership in bringing institutional-quality products to digital markets at scale, with nearly $150 billion in AUM connected to digital assets. Its programmable treasury fund has grown into the largest such fund in the world, alongside $65 billion in stablecoin reserves and nearly $80 billion in digital asset exchange-traded products.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Franklin Templeton has taken a different but equally deliberate path. The firm amended two Western Asset institutional money market funds to connect directly into US stablecoin reserve structures and programmable distribution channels, without altering their status as SEC-registered 2a-7 MMFs. The amendment preserves the regulatory identity of the instruments while extending their operational reach - a model other managers are watching closely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Franklin Templeton has also partnered with Binance to allow programmable fund shares to serve as collateral for institutional trades, demonstrating that eligibility and collateral logic can now be enforced at the moment of transfer rather than through post-trade reconciliation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Institutional adoption is accelerating across other asset classes as well. In real estate, Apex Group has begun providing fund services using Goldman Sachs&amp;#39; Digital Asset Platform, underscoring growing demand for programmable settlement and administration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Regulatory Floor Has Been Laid&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Market growth at this pace is rarely supply-driven alone. What changed in 2025 was the regulatory posture - in the United States specifically, but with implications across jurisdictions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In January 2026, the SEC Division of Corporation Finance, Division of Investment Management, and Division of Trading and Markets issued a statement setting out a basic taxonomy of programmable securities, elaborating on the principle that &amp;quot;securities, however represented, remain securities.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That position is both a constraint and a clarification. The SEC finds that the legal treatment of digital assets is determined by economic reality rather than technology. While distributed ledger technology and programmable assets can facilitate more efficient, transparent, and cost-effective transactions, increased activity makes strict compliance with applicable legal and regulatory requirements essential.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From a compliance perspective, the SEC is signaling that firms should stop waiting for bespoke rules and instead focus on applying existing obligations thoughtfully and rigorously. For broker-dealers, this means demonstrating how custody rules, supervisory obligations, and books-and-records requirements are satisfied in a distributed ledger environment. For firms engaging with programmable instruments, it means understanding how traditional concepts - possession, control, settlement&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Capital Markets</category><category>Issuance</category><category>Real-World Assets</category><author>Carter Bray</author></item><item><title>Is State Street&apos;s SSCXX the New Standard for Stablecoin Reserves?</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/state-street-sscxx-genius-act-stablecoin-reserves/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/state-street-sscxx-genius-act-stablecoin-reserves/</guid><description>State Street launches GENIUS Act-aligned money market fund for stablecoin reserves. Explore what compliant reserve infrastructure looks like.</description><pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 20:29:50 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;In brief:&lt;/strong&gt; State Street Investment Management has launched SSCXX, a Rule 2a-7 government money market fund structured specifically to hold reserves backing dollar-denominated payment instruments under the GENIUS Act. The fund accepts anchor investment from State Street Bank and Trust Company and Anchorage Digital and positions one of the world&amp;#39;s largest custodians directly in the reserve management business. For institutions evaluating how to issue, structure, or capitalize payment instruments at scale, the product sets a new bar for what compliant reserve infrastructure looks like.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The GENIUS Act Creates a Mandatory Reserve Architecture&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act, passed into law by the United States Congress in July 2025, creates a clearer regulatory framework to utilize money market funds registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 to back the issuance of stablecoins.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That framework is not permissive - it is prescriptive. Issuers are required to hold at least one dollar of permitted reserves for every one dollar of stablecoins issued, with permitted reserves limited to coins and currency, deposits at insured banks and credit unions, short-dated Treasury bills, repurchase agreements and reverse repos backed by Treasury bills, government money market funds, central bank reserves, and any other similar government-issued asset approved by regulators.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compliance is not simply a matter of asset selection. The GENIUS Act defines the disclosure requirements of any payment stablecoin issuer, including its redemption policy, monthly attestations of the composition of the reserves, and monthly CEO and CFO certifications of the reports. Issuers operating above the threshold face an additional layer of scrutiny: issuers with more than $50 billion in stablecoins outstanding are required to submit audited annual financial statements.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12553&quot;&gt;Congressional Research Service&amp;#39;s overview of the GENIUS Act&lt;/a&gt; and the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.richmondfed.org/banking/banker_resources/news_flash/2025/20251118_genius_act&quot;&gt;Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond&amp;#39;s analysis&lt;/a&gt; both confirm that the 1:1 reserve requirement, segregation of reserve assets, and prohibition on rehypothecation are binding obligations - not guidance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;State Street&amp;#39;s Product: Structure and Participants&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;State Street Investment Management&amp;#39;s fund is among the first GENIUS Act-aligned government money market funds to support stablecoin issuance at scale. It trades under the symbol SSCXX.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Operating as a registered Rule 2a-7 government money market fund, SSCXX places assets into cash holdings, short-dated U.S. Treasuries, repurchase agreements, and comparable cash equivalents - a configuration intended to deliver liquidity, preserve capital stability, and generate income for reserve holdings.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Its mandate focuses on cash, short-term U.S. Treasuries, repurchase agreements, and other cash equivalents, with objectives that fit stablecoin reserves: preserving principal, maintaining daily liquidity, and keeping a stable $1 net asset value per share.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;State Street Bank and Trust Company and Anchorage Digital, home to the first federally chartered crypto bank in the United States, are initial investors in the fund. State Street Investment Management, the asset management arm of State Street Corporation, oversees more than $5 trillion in assets and ranks among the world&amp;#39;s largest investment managers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Why Reserve Management Is Now a Competitive Market&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reserve management business is no longer incidental to stablecoin issuance - it is the central commercial prize. The move intensifies competition among major asset managers such as BlackRock, Franklin Templeton, Fidelity, and JPMorgan to oversee the Treasury bills, cash, and money market funds that support stablecoins. With Tether and Circle already holding tens of billions of dollars&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Capital Markets</category><category>Issuance</category><category>Regulation</category><author>Patrick Dyer</author></item><item><title>Can a Stablecoin Issuer Freeze Your Funds?</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/did-tether-freeze-344m-usdt-iran-pressure/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/did-tether-freeze-344m-usdt-iran-pressure/</guid><description>The U.S. Treasury and Tether&apos;s coordinated freeze of $344M in USDT linked to Iran sanctions evasion signals a new standard of compliance expectation for institutions issuing or transacting in programmable assets.</description><pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;On April 23, 2026, Tether froze more than $344 million in USDT held across two Tron addresses, acting in coordination with the U.S. Department of the Treasury&amp;#39;s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and federal law enforcement. The funds were linked to accounts suspected of sanctions evasion connected to Iranian financial networks. &lt;a href=&quot;https://tether.io/news/tether-supports-freeze-of-more-than-344-million-in-usdt-in-coordination-with-ofac-and-u-s-law-enforcement/&quot;&gt;Tether Supports Freeze of More Than 344 Million in USDT in Coordination with OFAC and U.S. Law Enforcement&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated: &amp;quot;We will follow the money that Tehran is desperately attempting to move outside of the country and target all financial lifelines tied to the regime.&amp;quot; &lt;a href=&quot;https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0465&quot;&gt;U.S. Treasury Press Release SB0465&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Compliance Implications for Institutional Issuers&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This action is a clear signal that the compliance obligations governing traditional financial instruments now apply with equal force to programmable assets. For institutions issuing, managing, or transacting in digital assets, several practical obligations follow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Heightened source-of-funds scrutiny.&lt;/strong&gt; Counterparties and investors are conducting more rigorous due diligence on the provenance of capital. Institutions that cannot document funding sources to a high standard face material transaction risk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Compliance as a structural requirement.&lt;/strong&gt; Regulatory conformance is not a post-issuance consideration. Sanctions screening, KYC/AML controls, and transfer restrictions must be embedded at the point of asset design and maintained through the asset&amp;#39;s lifecycle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Auditability as a commercial asset.&lt;/strong&gt; Clear, complete financial records reduce friction with institutional counterparties and regulators alike. The capacity to produce a full audit trail on demand is increasingly a condition of market access, not merely a best practice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Even minor compliance gaps carry disproportionate consequences. Institutions should engage legal counsel early in the issuance process and maintain ongoing review as the regulatory environment evolves.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Frequently Asked Questions&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What does this mean for institutions using digital assets in capital-raising or treasury operations?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Transactions in digital assets are subject to the same sanctions regimes as any other financial instrument. Institutions must ensure that all activity is screened against applicable OFAC and international sanctions lists, and that compliance programs are commensurate with the risk profile of the assets and counterparties involved.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How should businesses structure compliance programs to address international sanctions exposure?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Effective programs combine automated screening tools, regular independent audits, and clear escalation procedures. Compliance obligations also shift as sanctions designations are updated, so continuous monitoring is required rather than periodic review.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Are stablecoins appropriate for institutional transactions?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Stablecoins offer price stability and settlement efficiency, but their regulatory treatment continues to develop across jurisdictions. Institutions should conduct legal analysis specific to their use case and ensure that any stablecoin employed in an issuance or transaction structure meets current regulatory requirements in each relevant jurisdiction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Conclusion&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sanctions enforcement actions of this scale confirm that programmable assets operate within — not outside — the established regulatory perimeter. For institutions issuing or managing real-world assets in digital form, compliance infrastructure is a prerequisite, not an afterthought. The rules governing capital flows apply uniformly; the instruments have changed, but the obligations have not.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Stablecoins</category><category>Regulation</category><category>Compliance</category><category>Digital Assets</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>European Banks and Digital Assets: What MiCA Has Unlocked</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/europe-s-banks-going-crypto/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/europe-s-banks-going-crypto/</guid><description>MiCA has given Europe&apos;s largest banks a regulatory foundation to launch digital asset services at scale. Here is what that shift means for institutions issuing, financing, or transferring real-world assets.</description><pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Eight of Europe&amp;#39;s top twenty banks now offer live digital asset services. That figure, modest in isolation, marks a structural shift: the continent&amp;#39;s largest lenders are no longer observing the market for programmable assets — they are operating inside it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Regulatory Foundation: MiCA&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Markets in Crypto-Assets regulation has been the primary enabler. By establishing a single, harmonised framework across EU member states, MiCA gave banks the legal clarity required to extend custody, trading, and transfer services for digital assets within their existing compliance architecture. Regulatory certainty, not market enthusiasm, is what moved institutions off the sideline. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/european-banks-accelerate-crypto-adoption-8-of-top-20-offer-live-services?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;European banks accelerate crypto adoption: 8 of top 20 offer live services&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Where Banks Are Deploying Services&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several major European institutions have already moved from pilot to production:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;BBVA&lt;/strong&gt; has integrated digital asset trading and custody — covering Bitcoin and Ether — directly into its standard retail and private banking application. &lt;a href=&quot;https://paymentexpert.com/2025/07/07/bbvas-crypto-service-launch-another-sign-of-eus-leadership-status/?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;BBVA&amp;#39;s crypto service launch: another sign of EU&amp;#39;s leadership status&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KBC Bank&lt;/strong&gt; became the first Belgian lender to launch regulated digital asset trading through its Bolero platform, operating under MiCA authorisation with Crypto Finance as a licensed partner. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.crypto-finance.com/kbc-bank-launches-regulated-crypto-services-with-crypto-finance-as-partner/?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;KBC Bank launches regulated crypto services with Crypto Finance as partner&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CaixaBank&lt;/strong&gt; has secured EU-wide authorisation to provide custody, order execution, and transfer services for digital assets, establishing infrastructure for a full institutional offering across member states. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2026/04/271386-european-digital-banking-platform-caixabank-introduces-digital-assets-investment-services/?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;CaixaBank introduces digital assets investment services&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Implications for Issuers and Asset Managers&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The expansion of bank-grade digital asset infrastructure has direct consequences for institutions raising capital or managing assets:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Programmed issuance&lt;/strong&gt;: Equity or fund interests can be issued as digital securities — instruments that carry eligibility and transfer rules directly within the asset. Distribution through established banking channels then becomes operationally viable at scale.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Asset-backed financing&lt;/strong&gt;: Institutions holding digital assets can use them as collateral within bank lending facilities, providing a financing structure that sits alongside — not in place of — conventional credit arrangements.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Settlement and payment rails&lt;/strong&gt;: Digital asset infrastructure operated by regulated banks reduces correspondent costs and compresses settlement cycles for cross-border transfers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What Institutions Should Assess&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Are these services equivalent across banks?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No. Authorisation scope varies materially. Some institutions hold custody and execution licences; others are limited to specific asset classes or distribution channels. Institutions should conduct direct due diligence on the precise scope of each bank&amp;#39;s MiCA authorisation before structuring any arrangement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Does this displace existing capital market infrastructure?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It does not. Bank-operated digital asset services extend the available instrument set; they do not replace debt, equity, or fund structures that already function. The practical value lies in programmability — the ability to embed compliance, transfer restrictions, and corporate action logic into the instrument itself.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What is the appropriate starting point?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For institutions exploring programmed issuance or digital asset custody, the logical first step is a structured conversation with relationship banks about their current authorisation scope and operational readiness, benchmarked against the institution&amp;#39;s own capital markets objectives.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The convergence of MiCA&amp;#39;s regulatory framework and bank-grade operational infrastructure has materially lowered the barrier to issuing and managing digital assets within a compliant, institutional context. The conditions for programmed issuance at scale are in place. The question for issuers and asset managers is how to position within a market that is already moving.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Regulation</category><category>Institutional Finance</category><category>Asset Tokenization</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>The GENIUS Act: What the First Federal Stablecoin Framework Means for Issuers and Institutions</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/banks-slowing-genius-act-stablecoins/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/banks-slowing-genius-act-stablecoins/</guid><description>The GENIUS Act establishes the first federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins in the U.S. Here is what its reserve, licensing, and consumer protection rules mean for issuers, banks, and institutional participants.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act, enacted in July 2025, is the first federal framework to govern payment stablecoins in the United States. It introduces mandatory reserve backing, licensing obligations, and consumer protections that will reshape how stablecoins are issued, held, and competed over — with material consequences for banks, non-bank issuers, and institutional participants alike. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.grantthornton.com/insights/articles/banking/2025/genius-act-means-for-banks?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;Full analysis via Grant Thornton&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What the GENIUS Act Requires&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Act targets payment stablecoins — instruments pegged to the U.S. dollar and backed by liquid assets — and establishes four core obligations for issuers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Licensing and oversight.&lt;/strong&gt; Issuers must register with federal regulators. Those exceeding $10 billion in issuance fall under federal supervision; smaller issuers may operate under state-level oversight.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Reserve requirements.&lt;/strong&gt; Issuers must hold 100% reserves in cash, U.S. Treasury securities, or equivalent liquid instruments. The 1:1 backing requirement is not discretionary.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Audit and disclosure.&lt;/strong&gt; Monthly third-party attestations and regular public reserve disclosures are mandatory, establishing a minimum standard of transparency for institutional counterparties.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Consumer protections.&lt;/strong&gt; In an insolvency, stablecoin holders hold senior claims ahead of general creditors — a structural protection that distinguishes regulated instruments from their unregulated predecessors.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Enforcement practice will depend on the regulators involved and may vary across federal and state channels as the framework matures.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Competitive Concern for Banks&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Traditional banks have lobbied to delay implementation and tighten the Act&amp;#39;s scope, principally on competitive grounds. Their concern: non-bank entities — fintechs and other payment-focused issuers — may issue stablecoins without being subject to the same capital requirements that apply to deposit-taking institutions. The result, in banks&amp;#39; view, is an asymmetric competitive environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A secondary point of contention is yield. The Act prohibits issuers from paying interest directly to stablecoin holders, but it does not clearly prohibit affiliated platforms from offering reward or yield programs. Banks have pressed for that gap to be closed, arguing it represents a substantive loophole in the interest-equivalence restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Institutional Implications&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For institutions evaluating stablecoin infrastructure, the GENIUS Act materially changes the counterparty landscape. Regulatory clarity at the federal level is likely to support institutional adoption by reducing the compliance uncertainty that has limited engagement to date. Key considerations include:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Partner due diligence.&lt;/strong&gt; The Act creates a clearer basis for assessing whether a stablecoin issuer meets licensing and reserve standards — reducing, though not eliminating, counterparty risk.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Funding and settlement applications.&lt;/strong&gt; Compliant stablecoin infrastructure can support payment workflows, tokenized asset settlement, and diversified funding arrangements that were previously difficult to structure under an ambiguous regulatory regime.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Ongoing regulatory engagement.&lt;/strong&gt; The framework is new and its implementation will evolve. Institutions with active positions in stablecoin-adjacent products should monitor rulemaking closely and engage regulators where appropriate.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The GENIUS Act does not resolve every open question in stablecoin regulation, but it establishes the minimum floor from which institutional-grade infrastructure can now be built and evaluated.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Stablecoins</category><category>Regulation</category><category>Compliance</category><category>Digital Assets</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>Cryptocurrency ETNs in UK ISAs: What Issuers Need to Know</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/tax-free-bitcoin-back-uk-investors/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/tax-free-bitcoin-back-uk-investors/</guid><description>From April 2026, FCA-approved cryptocurrency ETNs may be held within Innovative Finance ISAs, offering UK investors a tax-efficient route to digital asset exposure. Here is what issuers and asset managers should consider.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;From April 2026, FCA-approved cryptocurrency exchange-traded notes (ETNs) will be eligible for inclusion within Innovative Finance ISAs (IFISAs). Gains held inside an ISA wrapper are free from UK capital gains tax. For issuers and asset managers designing digital asset products for the UK market, the change materially expands the addressable investor base.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Innovative Finance ISAs: Structure and Scope&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IFISAs were established to accommodate alternative investment instruments — principally peer-to-peer loans — that sit outside the scope of conventional Stocks and Shares ISAs. The April 2026 expansion extends eligible assets to include cryptocurrency ETNs that meet FCA requirements.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Key characteristics of the IFISA wrapper:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Tax treatment:&lt;/strong&gt; Capital gains realised within an IFISA are exempt from UK capital gains tax.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Asset eligibility:&lt;/strong&gt; Only FCA-approved cryptocurrency ETNs qualify; direct crypto holdings do not.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Market availability:&lt;/strong&gt; IFISA providers remain fewer in number than mainstream ISA platforms, though the regulatory change is expected to prompt new entrants.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Implications for Issuers&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For firms structuring or distributing cryptocurrency-linked instruments, IFISA eligibility represents a meaningful distribution advantage. Investors seeking tax-efficient exposure to digital assets have, until now, had limited options within a regulated wrapper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Issuers considering this pathway should address three areas:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Instrument structuring:&lt;/strong&gt; The ETN must be designed to satisfy FCA eligibility criteria for IFISA inclusion. Early engagement with legal and compliance counsel is essential.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Platform distribution:&lt;/strong&gt; Partnering with established IFISA providers is the most direct route to market. Issuers should assess platform due diligence requirements and investor suitability frameworks in advance.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Investor disclosure:&lt;/strong&gt; FCA rules require clear, accurate disclosure of the risks associated with cryptocurrency instruments — including volatility and potential for capital loss. Risk warnings and anti-money laundering controls are not optional.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Regulatory Requirements&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The FCA retains authority over which instruments may be admitted to IFISAs. No cryptocurrency ETN may be included without FCA approval. Issuers must ensure their products comply with applicable conduct rules, prospectus requirements, and ongoing reporting obligations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Regulatory essentials for issuers:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Obtain FCA approval for the ETN prior to any IFISA distribution agreement.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Maintain transparent investor communications covering product risks, fees, and liquidity terms.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Implement appropriate safeguards, including risk warnings and AML policies, as conditions of platform admission.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Market Precedent&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At least one UK fintech has already launched a Bitcoin ETN structured for IFISA eligibility. By securing admission to an established IFISA platform, the issuer gained access to a pool of investors specifically seeking tax-efficient digital asset exposure — a distribution channel that had not previously existed in this form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Can all cryptocurrencies be included in IFISAs?&lt;/strong&gt;
No. Only ETNs referencing cryptocurrencies that have received FCA approval for IFISA eligibility qualify. Direct holdings of cryptocurrency do not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What are the investment risks?&lt;/strong&gt;
ISA tax treatment does not eliminate investment risk. Cryptocurrency instruments carry significant price volatility, and investors may lose capital. Issuers must communicate this clearly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How should issuers confirm eligibility?&lt;/strong&gt;
Engagement with legal and financial advisers experienced in FCA authorisation and ISA regulations is the appropriate starting point. Eligibility determinations rest on specific product characteristics and FCA guidance.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the underlying regulatory context, see the &lt;a href=&quot;https://global.morningstar.com/en-gb/personal-finance/can-you-invest-crypto-tax-free-uk-isa-rules-just-changed&quot;&gt;Morningstar UK article&lt;/a&gt; on the amended ISA rules.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Regulation</category><category>Asset Issuance</category><category>Capital Markets</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>Kraken&apos;s 56 Million Tax Forms: The Case for Digital Asset Reporting Reform</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/kraken-56m-crypto-tax-forms-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/kraken-56m-crypto-tax-forms-2025/</guid><description>Kraken filed 56 million Form 1099-DAs with the IRS in 2025 — nearly a third covering transactions under $1. The filing illustrates the structural mismatch between current tax code and digital asset market realities, and the growing case for a de minimis exemption and staking income reform.</description><pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In 2025, Kraken submitted 56 million Form 1099-DAs to the IRS. Approximately 18.5 million of those forms covered transactions under $1. More than half covered transactions under $10. Only around 8.5% exceeded the $600 threshold that typically anchors reporting obligations in other asset classes. The volume and distribution of those filings make a pointed argument: the existing tax framework was not designed for the transaction granularity of digital asset markets. &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.kraken.com/policy/its-time-to-fix-digital-asset-taxes?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;Kraken has set out its position in full.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Compliance Costs Are Disproportionate to Economic Activity&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For individual investors, reconciling a large volume of small digital asset trades against current reporting requirements is operationally burdensome. Standard tax software does not accommodate digital asset activity at scale, which has created a market for specialist tools priced between $49 and $599 annually — a recurring compliance cost with no corresponding economic benefit at low transaction values.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For businesses and issuers, the administrative load is more acute. Managing a high volume of small transactions diverts resources from core operations, and the reporting obligation is uniform regardless of whether a transaction carries any material tax consequence.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Case for a De Minimis Exemption&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A de minimis threshold would exclude small digital asset transactions from treatment as taxable events. Under current rules, a routine payment — purchasing a $7.99 item using Bitcoin, for example — constitutes a taxable disposal requiring cost basis tracking and gain or loss calculation. At that transaction size, the compliance burden is wholly disproportionate to any revenue at stake.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A well-structured exemption, with clear definitional boundaries to prevent misuse, would materially reduce the reporting volume for exchanges, investors, and the IRS alike, while preserving full reporting obligations where economic activity is meaningful. &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.kraken.com/policy/its-time-to-fix-digital-asset-taxes?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;Further detail on the proposed reform is available here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Staking Rewards: A Structural Mismatch&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Current IRS guidance treats staking rewards as ordinary income at the moment of receipt, regardless of whether those rewards have been realised through a sale or exchange. This creates a phantom income problem: a taxpayer incurs a tax liability on an asset that has not been converted to cash and may decline in value before it is.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Allowing taxpayers to elect taxation upon disposal — rather than receipt — would align the timing of the tax event with the realisation of economic value. It would also reduce the volume of incidental tax filings generated by staking activity that has not yet produced a liquid return. &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.kraken.com/policy/its-time-to-fix-digital-asset-taxes?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;The staking taxation issue is discussed further here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Implications for Capital Formation&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Regulatory ambiguity and disproportionate compliance obligations are material considerations for institutional investors evaluating exposure to digital asset ventures. Where tax treatment is uncertain or administratively costly, risk-adjusted returns are depressed. Clearer exemptions and more rational treatment of staking income would reduce a friction point that currently affects both retail participation and institutional capital allocation in this market.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;FAQs&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What is a Form 1099-DA?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Form 1099-DA is the IRS reporting instrument for digital asset disposals and transactions. It records all reportable digital asset activity for a given tax year. &lt;a href=&quot;https://support.kraken.com/hc/articles/360001184966-Tax-forms-Frequently-asked-questions?utm_source=blokassets&quot;&gt;Further information is available via Kraken&amp;#39;s support documentation.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why does current law require reporting on every digital asset transaction, regardless of size?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Existing rules apply uniformly to all digital asset trades. There is no materiality threshold equivalent to those that exist in other areas of tax law. This produces reporting volumes — as Kraken&amp;#39;s 2025 filing illustrates — that are operationally unmanageable and yield minimal incremental tax revenue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How would a de minimis exemption affect businesses?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It would eliminate the obligation to track and report transactions below a defined threshold, reducing administrative overhead and allowing operational focus to return to core business activity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kraken&amp;#39;s 2025 filing is, in effect, a documented record of where current tax policy creates friction without proportionate benefit. A de minimis exemption and revised treatment of staking income are targeted, technically sound reforms. For issuers, exchanges, and institutional participants operating in this market, their adoption would reduce compliance costs and improve the clarity that capital formation requires.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Digital Assets</category><category>Regulation</category><category>Compliance</category><category>Payments</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>A $35 Million Control Failure: What the Shetty Fraud Case Tells Institutions</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/washington-cfo-steal-35m-fund-crypto/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/washington-cfo-steal-35m-fund-crypto/</guid><description>A former CFO was sentenced to prison for misappropriating $35 million into an undisclosed investment operation. The case is a study in what happens when internal controls, board oversight, and fiduciary accountability fail together.</description><pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2026 16:03:20 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In March 2026, former Fabric CFO Nevin Shetty was sentenced to two years in federal prison for wire fraud. Over the course of his tenure, he misappropriated $35 million of company capital into a personal investment operation — without board knowledge or authorisation. The case is a direct illustration of what governance and control failures cost.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;The Facts&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nevin Shetty joined Seattle-based software company Fabric as CFO in March 2021. He helped draft the company&amp;#39;s own investment policy, which mandated conservative, low-risk capital deployment. Despite that, he redirected $35 million of company funds into high-risk speculative investments through a privately held vehicle, HighTower Treasury, which he controlled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither Fabric&amp;#39;s executives nor its board were informed. The transfers were conducted without authorisation and outside the bounds of the policy Shetty himself had authored.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Initially, the positions generated a modest $133,000 return. In May 2022, the collapse of the Terra ecosystem wiped out nearly the entire position. The financial damage forced Fabric to lay off 60 employees. Shetty was subsequently convicted on four counts of wire fraud.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.geekwire.com/2026/former-startup-cfo-gets-2-years-in-prison-for-wire-fraud-crypto-scheme-that-cost-company-35m/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Former startup CFO gets 2 years in prison for wire fraud, crypto-scheme that cost company $35M&lt;/a&gt; | &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/former-cfo-convicted-trial-four-counts-wire-fraud?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;DOJ Press Release&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;What the Case Exposes&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three control failures compounded to produce this outcome.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. Policy without enforcement.&lt;/strong&gt; Fabric had an investment policy. Shetty wrote it. Its existence did not prevent the breach — because no independent mechanism verified that treasury activity conformed to it. A written policy that is not tested against actual cash flows is not a control; it is a document.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. Absent board visibility.&lt;/strong&gt; A CFO was able to transfer $35 million across multiple transactions over an extended period with no board-level detection. That is a structural gap in financial oversight, not an isolated lapse. Boards and audit committees require timely, independently prepared reporting on treasury positions and material capital movements to discharge their oversight function.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3. Inadequate counterparty and personnel diligence.&lt;/strong&gt; Shetty&amp;#39;s conflict of interest — operating a personal investment vehicle while directing company capital — was not identified prior to or during his tenure. Thorough diligence on principals with fiduciary authority, including review of outside business interests, is a basic precaution that this case demonstrates cannot be treated as optional.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Practical Implications for Institutions&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The lessons here are not novel, but the Shetty case gives them concrete form.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Enforce the investment policy, not just its existence.&lt;/strong&gt; Regular, independent reconciliation of treasury activity against authorised parameters is the mechanism that makes a policy operational.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Require board-level transparency on capital deployment.&lt;/strong&gt; Material movements of company capital should be subject to independent reporting lines that do not pass solely through the officer responsible for executing them.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Conduct structured diligence on fiduciary appointments.&lt;/strong&gt; Background review, conflict-of-interest declarations, and ongoing disclosure obligations for senior financial officers are proportionate to the authority they hold.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Calibrate risk exposure to mandate.&lt;/strong&gt; Speculative, illiquid, or highly volatile positions have no place in a treasury portfolio governed by a conservative mandate. When investment policy and actual practice diverge, the divergence should be visible — and consequential.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Context&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Shetty case is not isolated. A separate Seattle-area fraud involving a technology employee — sentenced to three years for misappropriating employer and third-party funds for personal use — underscores that this pattern of conduct is recurring, not exceptional. Both cases reinforce that sound financial governance is a structural requirement, not a periodic exercise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;FAQs&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How can institutions reduce exposure to this class of fraud?&lt;/strong&gt;
Through layered controls: independent reconciliation of treasury activity, board-level reporting on capital deployment, structured diligence on fiduciary appointments, and a clear escalation path for employees who identify policy breaches.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What is the risk when investment practice diverges from investment mandate?&lt;/strong&gt;
Significant. Undisclosed deviation from an authorised investment policy creates legal, financial, and reputational exposure — compounded when the deviation involves speculative or illiquid positions that cannot be unwound quickly under adverse conditions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why does transparency in financial operations matter to investors and counterparties?&lt;/strong&gt;
Because it is the basis on which they extend trust and capital. Institutions that can demonstrate rigorous, independently verified financial governance are materially better positioned to attract and retain institutional relationships.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Governance</category><category>Risk Management</category><category>Institutional Finance</category><author>Carter Bray</author></item><item><title>CME Group&apos;s 24/7 Crypto Derivatives: What Continuous Trading Means for Institutional Markets</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/cme-24-7-crypto-futures-reshape-derivatives/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/cme-24-7-crypto-futures-reshape-derivatives/</guid><description>CME Group will extend crypto futures and options trading to 24/7 from May 29, 2026. We examine what continuous regulated derivatives access means for institutional risk management, liquidity, and cross-border portfolio operations.</description><pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 16:02:33 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;h2&gt;CME Group&amp;#39;s Around-the-Clock Crypto Derivatives: Implications for Institutional Markets&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From May 29, 2026, CME Group will extend trading in cryptocurrency futures and options to a continuous, 24-hour schedule — subject only to a brief weekend maintenance window. The change is a material structural development in U.S. regulated derivatives, aligning exchange-traded instruments with the settlement and price-discovery rhythms of the underlying digital asset markets. CME Group: Coming May 29, 2026 — Crypto futures and options 24/7 trading&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Operational Considerations for Institutions&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For asset managers, corporate treasuries, and capital-raising entities, continuous derivatives access carries several practical consequences:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Real-time hedging.&lt;/strong&gt; Exposure to digital asset price movements can be managed intraday and across sessions, without the gap risk that arises when regulated venues are closed while underlying markets remain open.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Liquidity depth.&lt;/strong&gt; Extended hours broaden the pool of active participants across global time zones, which tends to compress bid-ask spreads and improve execution quality over time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Cross-border portfolio management.&lt;/strong&gt; Institutions operating across jurisdictions can align hedging activity with local market hours rather than subordinating it to U.S. session constraints.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;What Changes Structurally&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Traditional regulated exchanges operate within defined sessions. CME&amp;#39;s extension removes that constraint for its crypto derivatives suite, creating a single, continuous regulated venue for Bitcoin and Ether futures and options. The practical effect is that price discovery in listed derivatives will remain open during the same hours as spot digital asset markets — reducing the informational asymmetry that previously accumulated overnight and over weekends.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Suitability and Compliance&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Continuous access does not alter the underlying risk profile of these instruments. Institutions should assess:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Risk tolerance and mandate alignment.&lt;/strong&gt; Not every investment policy statement or fund mandate accommodates derivative overlays on digital assets. A review of governing documents is advisable before extending existing programs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Operational readiness.&lt;/strong&gt; Continuous trading requires monitoring and execution infrastructure capable of operating outside standard business hours.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Regulatory compliance.&lt;/strong&gt; Existing obligations under applicable derivatives regulation — including reporting, margin, and documentation requirements — apply irrespective of session timing. Institutions should confirm their compliance frameworks cover the expanded schedule.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;A Considered Position&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CME Group&amp;#39;s move is a considered response to a structural gap: regulated derivatives closing while the underlying market does not. For institutions already active in listed crypto derivatives, the extension removes a meaningful operational friction. For those evaluating entry, it lowers one practical barrier — continuous, exchange-regulated access — while leaving the substantive questions of suitability and mandate squarely in place.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Staying current with structural market changes of this kind is routine institutional practice. The extension of trading hours does not require a revised view on digital assets; it does warrant a review of how existing risk management and hedging programs are configured.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Derivatives</category><category>Regulation</category><category>Institutional Finance</category><category>Risk Management</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>Borrowing Against Staked Assets Without Leaving Regulated Custody</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/anchorage-kamino-leverage-staked-sol/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/anchorage-kamino-leverage-staked-sol/</guid><description>Anchorage Digital, Kamino, and Solana Company have introduced a tri-party custody model that allows institutions to borrow against staked SOL while assets remain in segregated, regulated custody. Here is how it works and what it means for treasury management.</description><pubDate>Sun, 15 Feb 2026 16:03:59 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anchorage Digital, Kamino, and Solana Company have introduced a tri-party custody model that allows institutions to borrow against natively staked SOL without removing assets from regulated custody. Collateral management, loan-to-value controls, and liquidations are handled programmatically, while assets remain in segregated accounts throughout. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/02/13/3238131/0/en/Solana-Company-NASDAQ-HSDT-Becomes-First-Digital-Asset-Treasury-to-Enable-Borrowing-Against-Natively-Staked-SOL-in-Qualified-Custody.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Solana Company NASDAQ HSDT Becomes First Digital Asset Treasury to Enable Borrowing Against Natively Staked SOL in Qualified Custody&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;New Mechanics for Institutional Liquidity&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anchorage Digital, Kamino, and Solana Company have jointly introduced a tri-party custody arrangement that allows institutions to borrow against staked SOL while those assets remain in qualified, segregated custody at Anchorage Digital Bank. No asset transfer is required to access liquidity. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/02/13/3238131/0/en/Solana-Company-NASDAQ-HSDT-Becomes-First-Digital-Asset-Treasury-to-Enable-Borrowing-Against-Natively-Staked-SOL-in-Qualified-Custody.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Solana Company NASDAQ HSDT Becomes First Digital Asset Treasury to Enable Borrowing Against Natively Staked SOL in Qualified Custody&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Institutional Implications&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For institutions holding staked digital assets, the arrangement addresses three operational requirements:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Custody integrity&lt;/strong&gt;: Staked SOL remains in a segregated account at Anchorage Digital Bank, satisfying regulatory custody requirements without interruption.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Liquidity access&lt;/strong&gt;: Kamino&amp;#39;s lending markets provide borrowing capacity against the collateral position without requiring an asset transfer or unstaking event.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Continued yield accrual&lt;/strong&gt;: Staking rewards continue to accrue to the account holder while the assets serve as collateral.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;How the Tri-Party Arrangement Operates&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The model assigns a distinct role to each party: &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/02/13/3238131/0/en/Solana-Company-NASDAQ-HSDT-Becomes-First-Digital-Asset-Treasury-to-Enable-Borrowing-Against-Natively-Staked-SOL-in-Qualified-Custody.html?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;details&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Anchorage Digital&lt;/strong&gt; manages collateral operations via its Atlas platform — including loan-to-value ratios, margin calls, and liquidations — in its capacity as qualified custodian.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Kamino&lt;/strong&gt; provides access to lending markets, enabling institutions to draw credit against staked collateral without relinquishing custody.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Anchorage Digital Bank&lt;/strong&gt; holds all assets in segregated accounts throughout the life of the transaction, maintaining the regulated custody chain.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Significance for Institutional Participants&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This structure resolves a long-standing tension for institutions seeking to deploy digital assets as collateral: how to access liquidity while preserving compliance obligations. The arrangement offers three concrete advantages:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Compliance continuity&lt;/strong&gt;: Assets do not leave a regulated custodian at any point, allowing institutions to participate in programmatic lending markets without compromising their custody or compliance frameworks.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Operational efficiency&lt;/strong&gt;: Automated collateral controls and real-time monitoring reduce manual oversight requirements and margin-call latency.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Capital efficiency&lt;/strong&gt;: Institutions avoid the friction of unstaking — including associated transaction costs and re-staking delays — while maintaining full exposure to staking yield.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Case in Point: Solana Company&amp;#39;s Treasury Application&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Solana Company (NASDAQ: HSDT), a publicly traded digital asset treasury, was the first institution to adopt this model. The company is using its SOL holdings as collateral to support treasury management operations and to fund participation in network security and expansion — without liquidating or moving the underlying position.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Frequently Asked Questions&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Q: Is this arrangement available to institutions that currently hold staked SOL?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A: The model is designed for institutional holders of staked SOL seeking liquidity without an asset transfer. Institutions should engage Anchorage Digital and Kamino directly to assess eligibility and borrowing terms.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Q: What risks should institutions evaluate?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A: While the structure enhances compliance continuity and custody security, institutions should conduct independent review of borrowing terms — including interest rates, loan-to-value thresholds, and liquidation mechanics — before entering into any arrangement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Q: Does this model affect existing compliance frameworks?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A: Because assets remain with a regulated custodian throughout, the arrangement is designed to be consistent with existing institutional compliance protocols. That said, legal and compliance teams should review the specific terms applicable to their jurisdiction and mandate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;Operational Consideration&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Market volatility can affect the value of collateral positions and trigger margin calls or liquidations under the programmatic controls managed by Anchorage Digital&amp;#39;s Atlas platform. Institutions should monitor collateral metrics on an ongoing basis as part of standard treasury risk management.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The tri-party custody model represents a meaningful advance in how institutions can program their digital asset positions — accessing liquidity, preserving yield, and maintaining custody without compromising regulatory standing. As the range of assets eligible for such arrangements expands, the underlying mechanics will become an increasingly standard component of institutional treasury practice.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Institutional Finance</category><category>Custody</category><category>Risk Management</category><category>Regulation</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item><item><title>Hong Kong SFC Expands Regulated Access to Virtual Asset Financing and Derivatives</title><link>https://www.issuant.com/articles/hk-sfc-allow-crypto-lending-asset-access/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.issuant.com/articles/hk-sfc-allow-crypto-lending-asset-access/</guid><description>Hong Kong&apos;s SFC has introduced margin financing for virtual assets and perpetual contracts for professional investors, extending institutional-grade risk frameworks to a new asset class.</description><pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 16:03:52 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hong Kong&amp;#39;s Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has extended its regulatory framework to permit licensed brokers to offer margin financing against virtual assets, and to grant professional investors access to perpetual contracts. The measures apply institutional-grade risk controls to a new asset class and reinforce Hong Kong&amp;#39;s position as a regulated centre for digital asset activity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;SFC Extends Margin Financing to Virtual Assets&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SFC has amended its conduct requirements to allow licensed brokers to extend margin loans where Bitcoin (BTC) and Ethereum (ETH) are held as collateral. The framework mirrors the risk discipline already applied in traditional securities lending: brokers must apply appropriate haircuts, maintain robust collateral management, and assess client suitability before extending credit. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.chinadailyhk.com/article/628845?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;China Daily HK&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Key provisions:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Eligible collateral:&lt;/strong&gt; BTC and ETH only, reflecting their relative liquidity and market depth among virtual assets.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Risk controls:&lt;/strong&gt; Brokers are required to apply conservative haircuts and maintain collateral levels sufficient to absorb market movement.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Client suitability:&lt;/strong&gt; Brokers must satisfy themselves that clients understand the risks specific to virtual asset collateral before lending proceeds.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Perpetual Contracts for Professional Investors&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SFC has also introduced a regulatory pathway for perpetual contracts — derivative instruments with no fixed expiry — restricted to professional investors. The framework sets defined leverage limits and minimum margin requirements, consistent with the SFC&amp;#39;s broader approach to managing systemic risk in complex instrument classes. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.quiknotes.in/hong-kongs-sfc-approves-crypto-margin-financing-and-perpetual-contracts-expanding-regulated-crypto-access-for-professional-investors/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;QuikNotes: Hong Kong&amp;#39;s SFC Approves Crypto Margin Financing and Perpetual Contracts&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Structural requirements:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Leverage limits:&lt;/strong&gt; Capped to constrain outsized exposure.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Margin requirements:&lt;/strong&gt; Minimum thresholds maintained throughout the life of the position.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Market stability controls:&lt;/strong&gt; Additional safeguards apply to preserve orderly market conditions.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Implications for Institutions and Issuers&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For asset managers, issuers, and brokers operating in or entering the Hong Kong market, these developments carry practical significance:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Expanded capital access:&lt;/strong&gt; Virtual assets held as collateral can now support margin financing arrangements, broadening the range of instruments that qualify in lending structures.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Regulatory clarity:&lt;/strong&gt; Defined conduct obligations reduce compliance uncertainty and support institutional confidence in the market.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Product scope:&lt;/strong&gt; The availability of regulated derivatives for professional investors extends the range of instruments that licensed intermediaries can offer.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Compliance Considerations&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Institutions seeking to operate within this framework must meet existing SFC licensing obligations for Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) and Virtual Asset Trading Platforms (VATPs), in addition to the conduct requirements specific to margin financing and derivatives. &lt;a href=&quot;https://air-corporate.com/blog/hong-kong-crypto-license/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Air Corporate: Hong Kong Crypto License&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Material obligations include:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Licensing:&lt;/strong&gt; Confirm applicable VASP and VATP authorisation requirements before offering in-scope products or services.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;AML/KYC:&lt;/strong&gt; Maintain Anti-Money Laundering and Know Your Customer programmes adequate for the risk profile of virtual asset activity.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Investor protection:&lt;/strong&gt; Adhere to the SFC&amp;#39;s conduct standards for both professional and retail clients, as applicable.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Institutions should also account for the continued volatility characteristics of virtual assets when structuring collateral and margin arrangements.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;FAQs&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Q: Who qualifies as a professional investor under Hong Kong&amp;#39;s regulations?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A: Individuals with portfolios of at least HK$8 million; corporations with portfolios of at least HK$8 million or total assets of at least HK$40 million; and institutional investors including licensed banks, broker-dealers, and asset managers. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.lw.com/admin/upload/SiteAttachments/Lexology-Panoramic-Hong-Kong-Cryptoassets-Blockchain.pdf?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;Lexology: Panoramic Hong Kong Cryptoassets &amp;amp; Blockchain&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Q: Is margin financing for virtual assets available to retail investors?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A: No. Under the current framework, margin financing against virtual asset collateral is restricted to professional investors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Q: What are the consequences of operating without the requisite authorisation?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A: Unlicensed activity may result in substantial financial penalties, imprisonment of responsible officers, and permanent disqualification from the market. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ccn.com/education/crypto/hong-kong-crypto-regulations-vasp-stablecoin-licensing-explained/?utm_source=issuant&quot;&gt;CCN: Hong Kong Crypto Regulations - VASP &amp;amp; Stablecoin Licensing Explained&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded><category>Regulation</category><category>Institutional Finance</category><category>Real-World Assets</category><category>Capital Markets</category><author>Ian Irizarry</author></item></channel></rss>